GHSA-PJHH-88PP-3HG6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP16 nframes bounds check
cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16() validates that the NDP header and its DPE entries fit within the skb. The first check correctly accounts for ndpoffset:
if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) > skb_in->len)
but the second check omits it:
if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16) + ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16))) > skb_in->len)
This validates the DPE array size against the total skb length as if the NDP were at offset 0, rather than at ndpoffset. When the NDP is placed near the end of the NTB (large wNdpIndex), the DPE entries can extend past the skb data buffer even though the check passes. cdc_ncm_rx_fixup() then reads out-of-bounds memory when iterating the DPE array.
Add ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to express the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23448"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-03T16:16:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP16 nframes bounds check\n\ncdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16() validates that the NDP header and its DPE\nentries fit within the skb. The first check correctly accounts for\nndpoffset:\n\n if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) \u003e skb_in-\u003elen)\n\nbut the second check omits it:\n\n if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16) +\n ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16))) \u003e skb_in-\u003elen)\n\nThis validates the DPE array size against the total skb length as if\nthe NDP were at offset 0, rather than at ndpoffset. When the NDP is\nplaced near the end of the NTB (large wNdpIndex), the DPE entries can\nextend past the skb data buffer even though the check passes.\ncdc_ncm_rx_fixup() then reads out-of-bounds memory when iterating\nthe DPE array.\n\nAdd ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to\nexpress the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.",
"id": "GHSA-pjhh-88pp-3hg6",
"modified": "2026-09-14T12:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T18:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23448"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2aa8a4fa8d5b7d0e1ebcec100e1a4d80a1f4b21a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/403f94ddcb36c552fbef51dea735b131e3dcde8b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63c35b8fce77a7892e8fa06c540d4943145506eb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/789204f980730258c983102c027c375238009c80"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dce9dda0e3707e887977db44407989e9ead26611"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1c7701d3ac91b62d672c13690cf295821f0d5c3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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