GHSA-PJH7-836P-GP8F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-10 21:31 – Updated: 2025-03-10 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mempolicy: fix uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy()
mpol_set_nodemask()(mm/mempolicy.c) does not set up nodemask when pol->mode is MPOL_LOCAL. Check pol->mode before access pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed in mpol_rebind_policy()(mm/mempolicy.c).
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:352 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_task+0x2ac/0x2c0 mm/mempolicy.c:368 mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:352 [inline] mpol_rebind_task+0x2ac/0x2c0 mm/mempolicy.c:368 cpuset_change_task_nodemask kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1711 [inline] cpuset_attach+0x787/0x15e0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:2278 cgroup_migrate_execute+0x1023/0x1d20 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2515 cgroup_migrate kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2771 [inline] cgroup_attach_task+0x540/0x8b0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2804 __cgroup1_procs_write+0x5cc/0x7a0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:520 cgroup1_tasks_write+0x94/0xb0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:539 cgroup_file_write+0x4c2/0x9e0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:3852 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x66a/0x9f0 fs/kernfs/file.c:296 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2162 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:503 [inline] vfs_write+0x1318/0x2030 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x28b/0x510 fs/read_write.c:643 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0xdb/0x120 fs/read_write.c:652 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:524 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3251 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3259 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x902/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:3264 mpol_new mm/mempolicy.c:293 [inline] do_set_mempolicy+0x421/0xb70 mm/mempolicy.c:853 kernel_set_mempolicy mm/mempolicy.c:1504 [inline] __do_sys_set_mempolicy mm/mempolicy.c:1510 [inline] __se_sys_set_mempolicy+0x44c/0xb60 mm/mempolicy.c:1507 __x64_sys_set_mempolicy+0xd8/0x110 mm/mempolicy.c:1507 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_task (2) https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=d6eb90f952c2a5de9ea718a1b873c55cb13b59dc
This patch seems to fix below bug too. KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_mm (2) https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f2fecd0d7013f54ec4162f60743a2b28df40926b
The uninit-value is pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed in mpol_rebind_policy(). When syzkaller reproducer runs to the beginning of mpol_new(),
mpol_new() mm/mempolicy.c
do_mbind() mm/mempolicy.c
kernel_mbind() mm/mempolicy.c
mode is 1(MPOL_PREFERRED), nodes_empty(*nodes) is true and flags
is 0. Then
mode = MPOL_LOCAL;
...
policy->mode = mode;
policy->flags = flags;
will be executed. So in mpol_set_nodemask(),
mpol_set_nodemask() mm/mempolicy.c
do_mbind()
kernel_mbind()
pol->mode is 4 (MPOL_LOCAL), that nodemask in pol is not initialized,
which will be accessed in mpol_rebind_policy().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-49567"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-908"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T07:01:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/mempolicy: fix uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy()\n\nmpol_set_nodemask()(mm/mempolicy.c) does not set up nodemask when\npol-\u003emode is MPOL_LOCAL. Check pol-\u003emode before access\npol-\u003ew.cpuset_mems_allowed in mpol_rebind_policy()(mm/mempolicy.c).\n\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:352 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_task+0x2ac/0x2c0 mm/mempolicy.c:368\n mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:352 [inline]\n mpol_rebind_task+0x2ac/0x2c0 mm/mempolicy.c:368\n cpuset_change_task_nodemask kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1711 [inline]\n cpuset_attach+0x787/0x15e0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:2278\n cgroup_migrate_execute+0x1023/0x1d20 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2515\n cgroup_migrate kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2771 [inline]\n cgroup_attach_task+0x540/0x8b0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2804\n __cgroup1_procs_write+0x5cc/0x7a0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:520\n cgroup1_tasks_write+0x94/0xb0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:539\n cgroup_file_write+0x4c2/0x9e0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:3852\n kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x66a/0x9f0 fs/kernfs/file.c:296\n call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2162 [inline]\n new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:503 [inline]\n vfs_write+0x1318/0x2030 fs/read_write.c:590\n ksys_write+0x28b/0x510 fs/read_write.c:643\n __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]\n __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]\n __x64_sys_write+0xdb/0x120 fs/read_write.c:652\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n\nUninit was created at:\n slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:524 [inline]\n slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3251 [inline]\n slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3259 [inline]\n kmem_cache_alloc+0x902/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:3264\n mpol_new mm/mempolicy.c:293 [inline]\n do_set_mempolicy+0x421/0xb70 mm/mempolicy.c:853\n kernel_set_mempolicy mm/mempolicy.c:1504 [inline]\n __do_sys_set_mempolicy mm/mempolicy.c:1510 [inline]\n __se_sys_set_mempolicy+0x44c/0xb60 mm/mempolicy.c:1507\n __x64_sys_set_mempolicy+0xd8/0x110 mm/mempolicy.c:1507\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n\nKMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_task (2)\nhttps://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=d6eb90f952c2a5de9ea718a1b873c55cb13b59dc\n\nThis patch seems to fix below bug too.\nKMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_mm (2)\nhttps://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f2fecd0d7013f54ec4162f60743a2b28df40926b\n\nThe uninit-value is pol-\u003ew.cpuset_mems_allowed in mpol_rebind_policy().\nWhen syzkaller reproducer runs to the beginning of mpol_new(),\n\n\t mpol_new() mm/mempolicy.c\n\t do_mbind() mm/mempolicy.c\n\tkernel_mbind() mm/mempolicy.c\n\n`mode` is 1(MPOL_PREFERRED), nodes_empty(*nodes) is `true` and `flags`\nis 0. Then\n\n\tmode = MPOL_LOCAL;\n\t...\n\tpolicy-\u003emode = mode;\n\tpolicy-\u003eflags = flags;\n\nwill be executed. So in mpol_set_nodemask(),\n\n\t mpol_set_nodemask() mm/mempolicy.c\n\t do_mbind()\n\tkernel_mbind()\n\npol-\u003emode is 4 (MPOL_LOCAL), that `nodemask` in `pol` is not initialized,\nwhich will be accessed in mpol_rebind_policy().",
"id": "GHSA-pjh7-836p-gp8f",
"modified": "2025-03-10T21:31:10Z",
"published": "2025-03-10T21:31:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/018160ad314d75b1409129b2247b614a9f35894c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13d51565cec1aa432a6ab363edc2bbc53c6f49cb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5735845906fb1d90fe597f8b503fc0a857d475e3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/777e563f10e91e91130fe06bee85220d508e7b9b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c5429a04ccd8dbcc3c753dab2f4126774ec28d4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1f8765f68bc9bf5744b365bb9f5e0b6db93edfe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aaa1c5d635a6fca2043513ffb5be169f9cd17d9e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddb3f0b68863bd1c5f43177eea476bce316d4993"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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