GHSA-PJ86-CFQH-VQX6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-01 18:59 – Updated: 2025-12-02 15:11Withdrawn Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it describes a correctness bug, not a vulnerability with real security impact. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
Impact
when using the extended query parser in express ('query parser': 'extended'), the request.query object inherits all object prototype properties, but these properties can be overwritten by query string parameter keys that match the property names
[!IMPORTANT]
the extended query parser is the default in express 4; this was changed in express 5 which by default uses the simple query parser
Patches
the issue has been patched to ensure request.query is a plain object so request.query no longer has object prototype properties. this brings the default behavior of extended query parsing in line with express's default simple query parser
Workaround
this only impacts users using extended query parsing ('query parser': 'extended'), which is the default in express 4, but not express 5. all users are encouraged to upgrade to the patched versions, but can otherwise work around this issue:
provide qs directly and specify plainObjects: true
app.set('query parser',
function (str) {
return qs.parse(str, {
plainObjects: true
});
});
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "express"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.22.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "express"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-51999"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-01T18:59:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-01T21:15:49Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Withdrawn Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it describes a correctness bug, not a vulnerability with real security impact. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\n### Impact\n\nwhen using the extended query parser in express (`\u0027query parser\u0027: \u0027extended\u0027`), the `request.query` object inherits all object prototype properties, but these properties can be overwritten by query string parameter keys that match the property names\n\n\u003e [!IMPORTANT] \n\u003e the extended query parser is the default in express 4; this was changed in express 5 which by default uses the simple query parser\n\n### Patches\n\nthe issue has been patched to ensure `request.query` is a plain object so `request.query` no longer has object prototype properties. this brings the default behavior of extended query parsing in line with express\u0027s default simple query parser\n\n### Workaround\n\nthis only impacts users using extended query parsing (`\u0027query parser\u0027: \u0027extended\u0027`), which is the default in express 4, but not express 5. all users are encouraged to upgrade to the patched versions, but can otherwise work around this issue:\n\n#### provide `qs` directly and specify `plainObjects: true`\n\n```js\napp.set(\u0027query parser\u0027,\n function (str) {\n return qs.parse(str, {\n plainObjects: true\n });\n});\n```",
"id": "GHSA-pj86-cfqh-vqx6",
"modified": "2025-12-02T15:11:19Z",
"published": "2025-12-01T18:59:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/express/security/advisories/GHSA-pj86-cfqh-vqx6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51999"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/express/commit/2f64f68c37c64ae333e41ff38032d21860f22255"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/express"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/express/releases/tag/4.22.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/express/releases/tag/v5.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Withdrawn Advisory: express improperly controls modification of query properties",
"withdrawn": "2025-12-02T15:11:19Z"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.