GHSA-PHXC-WW8F-9C6W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-16 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix SMB2 CREATE response buffer overflow
smb2_allocate_rsp_buf() uses the MAX_CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE (448-byte) buffer for a single SMB2_CREATE response. That buffer also holds a 4-byte length field, which only leaves 444 bytes for the SMB2 body.
The AAPL response made this buffer too small. After 8f1b796ff113, a request with AAPL response contexts may need at least 456 bytes. In the 456-byte case, create_aapl_rsp_buf() is appended last, clears 128 bytes, and writes 12 bytes past the allocation.
KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in create_aapl_rsp_buf+0x31/0x6e0
Write of size 128 at addr ffff88800370954c by task kworker/0:0/9
...
create_aapl_rsp_buf+0x31/0x6e0
smb2_open+0x58f9/0xef10
...
smb2_allocate_rsp_buf+0x19d/0x370
...
The buggy address is located 332 bytes inside of
allocated 448-byte region [ffff888003709400, ffff8880037095c0)
Reserve enough space for any fixed CREATE response KSMBD can build. Store the required allocation size in the per-dialect values table. This keeps the small buffer for other commands and avoids using the max transaction buffer for every CREATE.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99291"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T10:17:01Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: fix SMB2 CREATE response buffer overflow\n\nsmb2_allocate_rsp_buf() uses the MAX_CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE\n(448-byte) buffer for a single SMB2_CREATE response. That buffer also\nholds a 4-byte length field, which only leaves 444 bytes for the SMB2\nbody.\n\nThe AAPL response made this buffer too small. After 8f1b796ff113, a\nrequest with AAPL response contexts may need at least 456 bytes. In\nthe 456-byte case, create_aapl_rsp_buf() is appended last, clears 128\nbytes, and writes 12 bytes past the allocation.\n\nKASAN reports:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in create_aapl_rsp_buf+0x31/0x6e0\n Write of size 128 at addr ffff88800370954c by task kworker/0:0/9\n ...\n create_aapl_rsp_buf+0x31/0x6e0\n smb2_open+0x58f9/0xef10\n ...\n smb2_allocate_rsp_buf+0x19d/0x370\n ...\n The buggy address is located 332 bytes inside of\n allocated 448-byte region [ffff888003709400, ffff8880037095c0)\n\nReserve enough space for any fixed CREATE response KSMBD can build.\nStore the required allocation size in the per-dialect values table.\nThis keeps the small buffer for other commands and avoids using the max\ntransaction buffer for every CREATE.",
"id": "GHSA-phxc-ww8f-9c6w",
"modified": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
"published": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99291"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/713c31a3a225b6239a37ac7fbfb394567f8b3519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/824a572c0f909ca51fdb7e18e4eee33ca7896c7a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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