GHSA-PHHG-87VX-7J2V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-28 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: mcast: don't truncate the port group walk on teardown
__br_multicast_disable_port_ctx() and br_multicast_del_port() walk port->mglist with hlist_for_each_entry_safe(). However, br_multicast_find_del_pg() can also delete other entries from the same list through br_multicast_fwd_src_remove() or __fwd_del_star_excl().
If such an entry is the iterator's saved next node, hlist_del_init() clears its ->next and terminates the walk early. The reproducer triggers this in both teardown walks, leaving port groups in the bridge mdb with a dangling ->key.port after del_nbp() frees the port:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mdb_fill_info+0x1191/0x1320 __mdb_fill_info+0x1191/0x1320 br_mdb_dump+0x594/0xe40 rtnl_mdb_dump+0x1cf/0x5d0
Use hlist_del_init_rcu() to unlink the group while preserving ->next. br_multicast_del_pg() and the teardown walks run under br->multicast_lock. The GC worker must acquire the same lock before detaching the group for destruction, so the node remains alive while the walk uses the preserved pointer.
Preserving ->next means a walk can now reach a group that an earlier iteration already deleted as a side effect. That group is off mp->ports, so br_multicast_find_del_pg() would fall through its port scan and hit the trailing WARN_ON(1). Skip such groups at the top of that helper: a port group is put on port->mglist when it is created and only unlinked when it is deleted, so hlist_unhashed() identifies exactly this case.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99117"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T11:17:31Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: bridge: mcast: don\u0027t truncate the port group walk on teardown\n\n__br_multicast_disable_port_ctx() and br_multicast_del_port() walk\nport-\u003emglist with hlist_for_each_entry_safe(). However,\nbr_multicast_find_del_pg() can also delete other entries from the same\nlist through br_multicast_fwd_src_remove() or __fwd_del_star_excl().\n\nIf such an entry is the iterator\u0027s saved next node, hlist_del_init()\nclears its -\u003enext and terminates the walk early. The reproducer triggers\nthis in both teardown walks, leaving port groups in the bridge mdb with\na dangling -\u003ekey.port after del_nbp() frees the port:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mdb_fill_info+0x1191/0x1320\n __mdb_fill_info+0x1191/0x1320\n br_mdb_dump+0x594/0xe40\n rtnl_mdb_dump+0x1cf/0x5d0\n\nUse hlist_del_init_rcu() to unlink the group while preserving -\u003enext.\nbr_multicast_del_pg() and the teardown walks run under\nbr-\u003emulticast_lock. The GC worker must acquire the same lock before\ndetaching the group for destruction, so the node remains alive while\nthe walk uses the preserved pointer.\n\nPreserving -\u003enext means a walk can now reach a group that an earlier\niteration already deleted as a side effect. That group is off mp-\u003eports,\nso br_multicast_find_del_pg() would fall through its port scan and hit\nthe trailing WARN_ON(1). Skip such groups at the top of that helper: a\nport group is put on port-\u003emglist when it is created and only unlinked\nwhen it is deleted, so hlist_unhashed() identifies exactly this case.",
"id": "GHSA-phhg-87vx-7j2v",
"modified": "2026-10-28T12:31:03Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T12:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99117"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a3f7a683aee56e1f15c9d53041f3236767eaae7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8243d587a081e790ad96e80d48eef44d9f7ef005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b45e8c24608c992d1e2cea047eb5bcbfa537f86b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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