GHSA-PHH3-RPF3-3Q9P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-21 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: avoid NULL pointer dereference if no valid extent tree

[BUG] Syzbot reported a crash with the following call trace:

BTRFS info (device loop0): scrub: started on devid 1 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000208 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 106e70067 P4D 106e70067 PUD 107143067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 689 Comm: repro Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O 6.13.0-rc4-custom+ #206 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022 RIP: 0010:find_first_extent_item+0x26/0x1f0 [btrfs] Call Trace: scrub_find_fill_first_stripe+0x13d/0x3b0 [btrfs] scrub_simple_mirror+0x175/0x260 [btrfs] scrub_stripe+0x5d4/0x6c0 [btrfs] scrub_chunk+0xbb/0x170 [btrfs] scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x240/0x600 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x1dc8/0x2fa0 [btrfs] ? do_sys_openat2+0xa5/0xf0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

[CAUSE] The reproducer is using a corrupted image where extent tree root is corrupted, thus forcing to use "rescue=all,ro" mount option to mount the image.

Then it triggered a scrub, but since scrub relies on extent tree to find where the data/metadata extents are, scrub_find_fill_first_stripe() relies on an non-empty extent root.

But unfortunately scrub_find_fill_first_stripe() doesn't really expect an NULL pointer for extent root, it use extent_root to grab fs_info and triggered a NULL pointer dereference.

[FIX] Add an extra check for a valid extent root at the beginning of scrub_find_fill_first_stripe().

The new error path is introduced by 42437a6386ff ("btrfs: introduce mount option rescue=ignorebadroots"), but that's pretty old, and later commit b979547513ff ("btrfs: scrub: introduce helper to find and fill sector info for a scrub_stripe") changed how we do scrub.

So for kernels older than 6.6, the fix will need manual backport.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-21658"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-21T13:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: avoid NULL pointer dereference if no valid extent tree\n\n[BUG]\nSyzbot reported a crash with the following call trace:\n\n  BTRFS info (device loop0): scrub: started on devid 1\n  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000208\n  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n  PGD 106e70067 P4D 106e70067 PUD 107143067 PMD 0\n  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI\n  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 689 Comm: repro Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           O       6.13.0-rc4-custom+ #206\n  Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE\n  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022\n  RIP: 0010:find_first_extent_item+0x26/0x1f0 [btrfs]\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   scrub_find_fill_first_stripe+0x13d/0x3b0 [btrfs]\n   scrub_simple_mirror+0x175/0x260 [btrfs]\n   scrub_stripe+0x5d4/0x6c0 [btrfs]\n   scrub_chunk+0xbb/0x170 [btrfs]\n   scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [btrfs]\n   btrfs_scrub_dev+0x240/0x600 [btrfs]\n   btrfs_ioctl+0x1dc8/0x2fa0 [btrfs]\n   ? do_sys_openat2+0xa5/0xf0\n   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xc0\n   do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x120\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n[CAUSE]\nThe reproducer is using a corrupted image where extent tree root is\ncorrupted, thus forcing to use \"rescue=all,ro\" mount option to mount the\nimage.\n\nThen it triggered a scrub, but since scrub relies on extent tree to find\nwhere the data/metadata extents are, scrub_find_fill_first_stripe()\nrelies on an non-empty extent root.\n\nBut unfortunately scrub_find_fill_first_stripe() doesn\u0027t really expect\nan NULL pointer for extent root, it use extent_root to grab fs_info and\ntriggered a NULL pointer dereference.\n\n[FIX]\nAdd an extra check for a valid extent root at the beginning of\nscrub_find_fill_first_stripe().\n\nThe new error path is introduced by 42437a6386ff (\"btrfs: introduce\nmount option rescue=ignorebadroots\"), but that\u0027s pretty old, and later\ncommit b979547513ff (\"btrfs: scrub: introduce helper to find and fill\nsector info for a scrub_stripe\") changed how we do scrub.\n\nSo for kernels older than 6.6, the fix will need manual backport.",
  "id": "GHSA-phh3-rpf3-3q9p",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:01Z",
  "published": "2025-01-21T15:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21658"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fb37b7840fdcbf69d062a79d14afbf566b11873"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24b85a8b0310e0144da9ab30be42e87e6476638a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6aecd91a5c5b68939cf4169e32bc49f3cd2dd329"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aee5f69f3e6cd82bfefaca1b70b40b6cd8f3f784"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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