GHSA-PHG3-3G28-WQ9V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-21 15:47 – Updated: 2026-11-04 23:34
VLAI
Summary
Hatchet - Unauthenticated OAuth state CSRF / login-CSRF via empty-state collision in ValidateOAuthState
Details

Summary

Hatchet version v0.86.26 and below is vulnerable to OAuth state CSRF (login CSRF / account fixation).

The vulnerable code clears the session oauth_state_<integration> value to the empty string "" after a successful OAuth callback rather than removing the key, and the subsequent state-equality check then accepts an empty ?state= parameter on any later callback request — allowing an unauthenticated attacker to bind an already-authenticated victim's session cookie to an attacker-controlled OAuth identity (account takeover via login-CSRF).

Impact

Affected configurations: any deployment that has enabled at least one of auth.google.enabled, auth.github.enabled, or the Slack integration, and where the victim has completed at least one OAuth flow on that integration in the current session. Bug present on main HEAD and in every tagged release up to and including v0.86.26 (commit 243f41d9e1161e70d47dfc0a6509f1c4ddfc9c23).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.91.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61687"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1275",
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-352",
      "CWE-384"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-21T15:47:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T16:17:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nHatchet version v0.86.26 and below is vulnerable to OAuth state CSRF (login CSRF / account fixation). \n\nThe vulnerable code clears the session `oauth_state_\u003cintegration\u003e` value to the empty string `\"\"` after a successful OAuth callback rather than removing the key, and the subsequent state-equality check then accepts an empty `?state=` parameter on any later callback request \u2014 allowing an unauthenticated attacker to bind an already-authenticated victim\u0027s session cookie to an attacker-controlled OAuth identity (account takeover via login-CSRF). \n\n\n### Impact\n\nAffected configurations: any deployment that has enabled at least one of `auth.google.enabled`, `auth.github.enabled`, or the Slack integration, and where the victim has completed at least one OAuth flow on that integration in the current session. Bug present on `main` HEAD and in every tagged release up to and including v0.86.26 (commit `243f41d9e1161e70d47dfc0a6509f1c4ddfc9c23`).",
  "id": "GHSA-phg3-3g28-wq9v",
  "modified": "2026-11-04T23:34:47Z",
  "published": "2026-09-21T15:47:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/security/advisories/GHSA-phg3-3g28-wq9v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61687"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/commit/f90464189ad642251e09412d0f99fde353036428"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hatchet - Unauthenticated OAuth state CSRF / login-CSRF via empty-state collision in ValidateOAuthState"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.