GHSA-PGHR-8XHX-XV5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-03 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: misc: uss720: unregister parport on probe failure
uss720_probe() registers a parport before reading the 1284 register used to detect unsupported Belkin F5U002 adapters. If get_1284_register() fails, the error path drops the driver private data and the USB device reference, but leaves the parport device registered.
Leaving the port registered is more than a private allocation leak: parport_register_port() has already reserved a parport number and registered the parport bus device, while pp->private_data still points at the private data that the common error path is about to release.
Undo the pre-announce registration in the get_1284_register() failure branch before jumping to the common private-data cleanup path. Clear priv->pp first, matching the disconnect path and avoiding a stale pointer in the private data.
This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64338"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: misc: uss720: unregister parport on probe failure\n\nuss720_probe() registers a parport before reading the 1284 register used\nto detect unsupported Belkin F5U002 adapters. If get_1284_register()\nfails, the error path drops the driver private data and the USB device\nreference, but leaves the parport device registered.\n\nLeaving the port registered is more than a private allocation leak:\nparport_register_port() has already reserved a parport number and\nregistered the parport bus device, while pp-\u003eprivate_data still points at\nthe private data that the common error path is about to release.\n\nUndo the pre-announce registration in the get_1284_register() failure\nbranch before jumping to the common private-data cleanup path. Clear\npriv-\u003epp first, matching the disconnect path and avoiding a stale pointer\nin the private data.\n\nThis issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while\nreviewing kernel code.",
"id": "GHSA-pghr-8xhx-xv5x",
"modified": "2026-09-03T18:31:17Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64338"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b3073f40cc9f95d5ff0037eb0a06f5c1725a7ea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1712fd71a5aaf81e47c747f180535fa963ad7830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48dd0b2ec9f2e97c486eb68cd0a64b25c1c3df3e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e62d7857fd51b908b8371062ee839739a086bbe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bbb98bec71b577fda4f4b48f7aea5874b04a576"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/729b68a5bad71220ae0914c8bdab9488ad5be6c8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93563243377f8e9b46cc94d9c4f06533dd31b141"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4ecbdc4f8830f5586c4a5cfc384c00f20f8f8b3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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