GHSA-PFFQ-9WR4-6HJX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-06-28 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ena: PHC: Fix potential use-after-free in get_timestamp
Move the phc->active check and resp pointer assignment to after acquiring the spinlock. Previously, phc->active was checked without holding the lock, and resp was cached from ena_dev->phc.virt_addr before the lock was acquired.
If ena_com_phc_destroy() runs between the lockless active check and the lock acquisition, it sets active=false, releases the lock, frees the DMA memory, and sets virt_addr=NULL. The get_timestamp path would then read a NULL virt_addr and dereference it.
With both the active check and the pointer read under the lock, destroy cannot free the memory while get_timestamp is using it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52971"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ena: PHC: Fix potential use-after-free in get_timestamp\n\nMove the phc-\u003eactive check and resp pointer assignment to after\nacquiring the spinlock. Previously, phc-\u003eactive was checked without\nholding the lock, and resp was cached from ena_dev-\u003ephc.virt_addr\nbefore the lock was acquired.\n\nIf ena_com_phc_destroy() runs between the lockless active check and\nthe lock acquisition, it sets active=false, releases the lock, frees\nthe DMA memory, and sets virt_addr=NULL. The get_timestamp path would\nthen read a NULL virt_addr and dereference it.\n\nWith both the active check and the pointer read under the lock,\ndestroy cannot free the memory while get_timestamp is using it.",
"id": "GHSA-pffq-9wr4-6hjx",
"modified": "2026-06-28T09:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-06-24T18:32:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52971"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95e8ae9af2a61b4e72f5c585bf4c7d8aaf2a2c98"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca9ed40f28949353911dcb524ff8fff2f3409c97"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e42c755582f0960e684298762f0ab927b3778376"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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