GHSA-PC8X-JH6X-8JFR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-12 15:31 – Updated: 2025-10-03 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memblock: make memblock_set_node() also warn about use of MAX_NUMNODES
On an (old) x86 system with SRAT just covering space above 4Gb:
ACPI: SRAT: Node 0 PXM 0 [mem 0x100000000-0xfffffffff] hotplug
the commit referenced below leads to this NUMA configuration no longer being refused by a CONFIG_NUMA=y kernel (previously
NUMA: nodes only cover 6144MB of your 8185MB e820 RAM. Not used.
No NUMA configuration found
Faking a node at [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000027fffffff]
was seen in the log directly after the message quoted above), because of memblock_validate_numa_coverage() checking for NUMA_NO_NODE (only). This in turn led to memblock_alloc_range_nid()'s warning about MAX_NUMNODES triggering, followed by a NULL deref in memmap_init() when trying to access node 64's (NODE_SHIFT=6) node data.
To compensate said change, make memblock_set_node() warn on and adjust a passed in value of MAX_NUMNODES, just like various other functions already do.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-40917"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-12T13:15:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmemblock: make memblock_set_node() also warn about use of MAX_NUMNODES\n\nOn an (old) x86 system with SRAT just covering space above 4Gb:\n\n ACPI: SRAT: Node 0 PXM 0 [mem 0x100000000-0xfffffffff] hotplug\n\nthe commit referenced below leads to this NUMA configuration no longer\nbeing refused by a CONFIG_NUMA=y kernel (previously\n\n NUMA: nodes only cover 6144MB of your 8185MB e820 RAM. Not used.\n No NUMA configuration found\n Faking a node at [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000027fffffff]\n\nwas seen in the log directly after the message quoted above), because of\nmemblock_validate_numa_coverage() checking for NUMA_NO_NODE (only). This\nin turn led to memblock_alloc_range_nid()\u0027s warning about MAX_NUMNODES\ntriggering, followed by a NULL deref in memmap_init() when trying to\naccess node 64\u0027s (NODE_SHIFT=6) node data.\n\nTo compensate said change, make memblock_set_node() warn on and adjust\na passed in value of MAX_NUMNODES, just like various other functions\nalready do.",
"id": "GHSA-pc8x-jh6x-8jfr",
"modified": "2025-10-03T15:31:13Z",
"published": "2024-07-12T15:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40917"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22f742b8f738918f683198a18ec3c691acda14c4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ddb7f966f3d06fcf1ba5ee298af6714b593584b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0eec24e2e199873f43df99ec39773ad3af2bff7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Vulnerability timeline
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