GHSA-P9X2-F535-HFC3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-16 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: don't BUG when the copy buffer is exhausted
fuse_copy_fill() hits BUG_ON(!err) once the iterator backing the copy runs out of pages. Over io-uring the amount copied is not bounded by the payload buffer the server registered, so an unprivileged user can drain the iterator and panic the host - mount a FUSE filesystem with small payload buffers, then setxattr() a larger value:
kernel BUG at fs/fuse/dev.c:1064! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 148 Comm: exploit Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1 #2 RIP: 0010:fuse_copy_fill (fs/fuse/dev.c:1033) Call Trace: fuse_copy_args (fs/fuse/dev.c:1354 fs/fuse/dev.c:1380) fuse_uring_args_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:891) fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:940 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1057) fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1745) tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96) tctx_task_work (io_uring/tw.c:133) task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233) io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84) io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278) __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2676) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
The reply path can drain it the same way, via the server-supplied payload_sz in fuse_uring_copy_from_ring().
Return -EIO instead. All three fuse_copy_fill() callers already propagate the error.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99293"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T10:17:01Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfuse: don\u0027t BUG when the copy buffer is exhausted\n\nfuse_copy_fill() hits BUG_ON(!err) once the iterator backing the copy\nruns out of pages. Over io-uring the amount copied is not bounded by the\npayload buffer the server registered, so an unprivileged user can drain\nthe iterator and panic the host - mount a FUSE filesystem with small\npayload buffers, then setxattr() a larger value:\n\n kernel BUG at fs/fuse/dev.c:1064!\n Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 148 Comm: exploit Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1 #2\n RIP: 0010:fuse_copy_fill (fs/fuse/dev.c:1033)\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n fuse_copy_args (fs/fuse/dev.c:1354 fs/fuse/dev.c:1380)\n fuse_uring_args_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:891)\n fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:940 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1057)\n fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1745)\n tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96)\n tctx_task_work (io_uring/tw.c:133)\n task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233)\n io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84)\n io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278)\n __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2676)\n do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61)\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)\n\nThe reply path can drain it the same way, via the server-supplied\npayload_sz in fuse_uring_copy_from_ring().\n\nReturn -EIO instead. All three fuse_copy_fill() callers already\npropagate the error.",
"id": "GHSA-p9x2-f535-hfc3",
"modified": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
"published": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99293"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10a58bf0107a02854584ed79281d05a84d62d900"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61adcab593ff6bb806ba09df8c2c3d7e19edc908"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1338aae7b4054e26f322155423f6aba90aeea23"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.