GHSA-P9F8-WVJ8-2FG8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 17:59 – Updated: 2026-09-29 17:59Summary
The OpenTelemetry Go SDK trace package can fail to enforce AttributeValueLengthLimit for string attributes containing the valid Unicode replacement character U+FFFD. An oversized attacker-controlled attribute value that includes U+FFFD is returned untruncated, bypassing the configured memory/DoS protection and allowing increased per-span memory usage. The finding is low severity because it requires a deployment with attribute value length limits enabled and attacker-controlled data being recorded into span attributes.
Introduced in commit 49a6536
Details
String and string-slice span attributes are truncated through safeTruncate when AttributeValueLengthLimit is non-negative. The finding evidence identifies this enforcement path in sdk/trace/span.go:303-331, with string attributes passed to safeTruncate at sdk/trace/span.go:309-310 and string-slice entries passed to safeTruncate in the loop beginning at sdk/trace/span.go:312.
safeTruncate first calls safeTruncateValidUTF8; if that returns ok=false, it calls strings.ToValidUTF8(input, "") and retries. The relevant code is identified in sdk/trace/span.go:337-355. safeTruncateValidUTF8 treats any utf8.RuneError from utf8.DecodeRuneInString as invalid UTF-8 and immediately returns the original input with ok=false. However, Go also returns utf8.RuneError for a valid encoded U+FFFD rune. The validation artifact confirms this behavior with output r=U+FFFD size=3 runeError=true.
For an input such as "AAAA" + U+FFFD + strings.Repeat("B", 20) and a limit of 5, the first truncation attempt sees U+FFFD as utf8.RuneError and returns the full input with ok=false. strings.ToValidUTF8 does not remove the valid U+FFFD rune, so the second attempt returns the same full input. As a result, the span attribute value remains 27 bytes long even though the configured limit is 5.
PoC
The validation artifact contains a package-level Go test at validation-artifact.tar:safe_truncate_bypass/safe_truncate_poc_test.go and supporting output at validation-artifact.tar:safe_truncate_bypass/runecheck_output.txt.
Reproduction configuration:
- Repository: pellared/opentelemetry-go
- Commit: 49a6536 from September 12, 2022
- Package/module path: sdk/trace under the sdk module
- Attribute value length limit used by the PoC: limit := 5
- Dependencies must be available through the network or a local module cache/vendor directory.
Commands:
cd /path/to/opentelemetry-go
git checkout 49a6536
tar -xOf /path/to/validation-artifact.tar safe_truncate_bypass/safe_truncate_poc_test.go > sdk/trace/safe_truncate_poc_test.go
cd sdk
go test ./trace -run TestSafeTruncateBypass -count=1 -v
Expected vulnerable output includes a failing test showing that the returned value exceeds the configured limit:
=== RUN TestSafeTruncateBypass
safe_truncate_poc_test.go:14: input_len=27 got_len=27 input="AAAA�BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" got="AAAA�BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
safe_truncate_poc_test.go:16: bypass: got_len 27 > limit 5
--- FAIL: TestSafeTruncateBypass
The artifact also records the standalone UTF-8 behavior needed for the bypass:
tar -xOf /path/to/validation-artifact.tar safe_truncate_bypass/runecheck_output.txt
Expected output:
r=U+FFFD size=3 runeError=true
Impact
This is a Unicode handling and resource-limit bypass that weakens span attribute memory controls. Applications that enable AttributeValueLengthLimit to bound memory usage can still store oversized attacker-controlled attribute values if those values contain U+FFFD. The practical impact is increased memory use and reduced denial-of-service protection in the instrumented process; the finding does not show confidentiality or integrity impact.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.10.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.33.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81869"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-176",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-29T17:59:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T21:17:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe OpenTelemetry Go SDK trace package can fail to enforce `AttributeValueLengthLimit` for string attributes containing the valid Unicode replacement character U+FFFD. An oversized attacker-controlled attribute value that includes U+FFFD is returned untruncated, bypassing the configured memory/DoS protection and allowing increased per-span memory usage. The finding is low severity because it requires a deployment with attribute value length limits enabled and attacker-controlled data being recorded into span attributes.\n\nIntroduced in commit 49a6536\n\n### Details\n\nString and string-slice span attributes are truncated through `safeTruncate` when `AttributeValueLengthLimit` is non-negative. The finding evidence identifies this enforcement path in `sdk/trace/span.go:303-331`, with string attributes passed to `safeTruncate` at `sdk/trace/span.go:309-310` and string-slice entries passed to `safeTruncate` in the loop beginning at `sdk/trace/span.go:312`.\n\n`safeTruncate` first calls `safeTruncateValidUTF8`; if that returns `ok=false`, it calls `strings.ToValidUTF8(input, \"\")` and retries. The relevant code is identified in `sdk/trace/span.go:337-355`. `safeTruncateValidUTF8` treats any `utf8.RuneError` from `utf8.DecodeRuneInString` as invalid UTF-8 and immediately returns the original input with `ok=false`. However, Go also returns `utf8.RuneError` for a valid encoded U+FFFD rune. The validation artifact confirms this behavior with output `r=U+FFFD size=3 runeError=true`.\n\nFor an input such as `\"AAAA\" + U+FFFD + strings.Repeat(\"B\", 20)` and a limit of 5, the first truncation attempt sees U+FFFD as `utf8.RuneError` and returns the full input with `ok=false`. `strings.ToValidUTF8` does not remove the valid U+FFFD rune, so the second attempt returns the same full input. As a result, the span attribute value remains 27 bytes long even though the configured limit is 5.\n\n### PoC\n\n[validation-artifact.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27494267/validation-artifact.zip)\n\n\nThe validation artifact contains a package-level Go test at `validation-artifact.tar:safe_truncate_bypass/safe_truncate_poc_test.go` and supporting output at `validation-artifact.tar:safe_truncate_bypass/runecheck_output.txt`.\n\nReproduction configuration:\n- Repository: `pellared/opentelemetry-go`\n- Commit: `49a6536` from September 12, 2022\n- Package/module path: `sdk/trace` under the `sdk` module\n- Attribute value length limit used by the PoC: `limit := 5`\n- Dependencies must be available through the network or a local module cache/vendor directory.\n\nCommands:\n```sh\ncd /path/to/opentelemetry-go\ngit checkout 49a6536\ntar -xOf /path/to/validation-artifact.tar safe_truncate_bypass/safe_truncate_poc_test.go \u003e sdk/trace/safe_truncate_poc_test.go\ncd sdk\ngo test ./trace -run TestSafeTruncateBypass -count=1 -v\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output includes a failing test showing that the returned value exceeds the configured limit:\n```text\n=== RUN TestSafeTruncateBypass\n safe_truncate_poc_test.go:14: input_len=27 got_len=27 input=\"AAAA\ufffdBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB\" got=\"AAAA\ufffdBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB\"\n safe_truncate_poc_test.go:16: bypass: got_len 27 \u003e limit 5\n--- FAIL: TestSafeTruncateBypass\n```\n\nThe artifact also records the standalone UTF-8 behavior needed for the bypass:\n```sh\ntar -xOf /path/to/validation-artifact.tar safe_truncate_bypass/runecheck_output.txt\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```text\nr=U+FFFD size=3 runeError=true\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a Unicode handling and resource-limit bypass that weakens span attribute memory controls. Applications that enable `AttributeValueLengthLimit` to bound memory usage can still store oversized attacker-controlled attribute values if those values contain U+FFFD. The practical impact is increased memory use and reduced denial-of-service protection in the instrumented process; the finding does not show confidentiality or integrity impact.",
"id": "GHSA-p9f8-wvj8-2fg8",
"modified": "2026-09-29T17:59:10Z",
"published": "2026-09-29T17:59:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-p9f8-wvj8-2fg8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81869"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/issues/5996"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/pull/5997"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/e016a78c9f5b24a1c2beeaad47686c2f2213f49a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/sdk/v1.33.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenTelemetry-Go: UTF-8 replacement rune bypasses attribute length truncation"
}
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