GHSA-P8R6-WXQ7-5FV3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-24 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/vm: nuke PTs only after unlinking contested VMAs
In xe_vm_close_and_put(), external-BO VMAs are queued on the contested list for deferred destruction via xe_vma_destroy_unlocked(). However, xe_vm_pt_destroy() was previously invoked before processing contested VMAs, destroying vm->pt_root while those VMAs were still linked to their respective buffer objects (vm_bo->list.gpuva).
If a concurrent thread evicts one of those shared buffer objects, xe_bo_trigger_rebind() holding only bo->resv walks the BO's VMAs and, in fault mode, calls xe_vm_invalidate_vma() -> xe_pt_zap_ptes(). Because vm->pt_root[tile->id] is already NULL, dereferencing pt->level causes a NULL ptr deref.
Fix this by deferring xe_vm_free_scratch() and xe_vm_pt_destroy() until after all contested VMAs have been unlinked and destroyed.
User is reporting hitting a NULL ptr deref in xe_pt_zap_ptes(), which could be explained by this race.
(cherry picked from commit c2863648959489767f08892fd6e90577d2ea0b6a)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98510"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/xe/vm: nuke PTs only after unlinking contested VMAs\n\nIn xe_vm_close_and_put(), external-BO VMAs are queued on the contested\nlist for deferred destruction via xe_vma_destroy_unlocked(). However,\nxe_vm_pt_destroy() was previously invoked before processing contested\nVMAs, destroying vm-\u003ept_root while those VMAs were still linked to their\nrespective buffer objects (vm_bo-\u003elist.gpuva).\n\nIf a concurrent thread evicts one of those shared buffer objects,\nxe_bo_trigger_rebind() holding only bo-\u003eresv walks the BO\u0027s VMAs and, in\nfault mode, calls xe_vm_invalidate_vma() -\u003e xe_pt_zap_ptes(). Because\nvm-\u003ept_root[tile-\u003eid] is already NULL, dereferencing pt-\u003elevel causes a\nNULL ptr deref.\n\nFix this by deferring xe_vm_free_scratch() and xe_vm_pt_destroy() until\nafter all contested VMAs have been unlinked and destroyed.\n\nUser is reporting hitting a NULL ptr deref in xe_pt_zap_ptes(), which\ncould be explained by this race.\n\n(cherry picked from commit c2863648959489767f08892fd6e90577d2ea0b6a)",
"id": "GHSA-p8r6-wxq7-5fv3",
"modified": "2026-10-24T15:32:47Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98510"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24a22fb3c731474b68e986af6804db450fb88617"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70fddc065ac80845ffd33095b3635d59883cf7e6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba678c2b02e0d36b53deb5a6d5e5ea044d36def7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bddaa5e4094c134452c29e20a26c4718827e4cb1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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