GHSA-P8Q6-7938-6FJX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtnetlink: wait for RCU readers in rtnl_link_unregister()
rtnl_link_ops_get() finds ops on link_ops under rcu_read_lock() and only then takes ops->srcu. rtnl_link_unregister() unlinks ops, then calls synchronize_srcu() and cleanup_srcu_struct() without first waiting for RCU readers. A reader that found ops before list_del_rcu() and has not yet taken ops->srcu is not waited for.
Such a reader then locks a cleaned-up srcu_struct and keeps using ops after the module that owns it is gone. rtnl_newlink() and rtnl_dump_ifinfo() both look up ops without RTNL, the latter for any user that dumps links filtered by kind.
With delays added between the lookup and srcu_read_lock() in rtnl_link_ops_get(), and before rtnl_link_ops_put() in rtnl_dump_ifinfo(), running "ip link show type dummy" alongside "rmmod dummy" on a KASAN kernel gives:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __srcu_read_unlock+0x57/0x70 Read of size 8 at addr ffffffffc02ff318 by task ip/147 Call Trace: __srcu_read_unlock+0x57/0x70 rtnl_dump_ifinfo.cold+0x30/0x3b rtnl_dumpit+0x7a/0x1b0 netlink_dump+0x486/0x11b0 __netlink_dump_start+0x661/0x910 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x611/0x9e0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x126/0x380 netlink_unicast+0x605/0x830 netlink_sendmsg+0x6d0/0xbb0 __sys_sendto+0x335/0x3a0
Call synchronize_rcu() before synchronize_srcu(), as rtnl_af_unregister() already does. This should be enough because rtnl_link_ops_get() is the only RCU walker of link_ops, and it takes ops->srcu before rcu_read_unlock(), so every reader that found ops is covered by synchronize_srcu() once the RCU grace period ends. The extra grace period only costs time at module unload.
Readers and the writer were serialized by RTNL until link_ops got its own mutex, which is why the missing RCU wait did not matter before.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99401"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:52Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrtnetlink: wait for RCU readers in rtnl_link_unregister()\n\nrtnl_link_ops_get() finds ops on link_ops under rcu_read_lock() and only\nthen takes ops-\u003esrcu. rtnl_link_unregister() unlinks ops, then calls\nsynchronize_srcu() and cleanup_srcu_struct() without first waiting for\nRCU readers. A reader that found ops before list_del_rcu() and has not yet\ntaken ops-\u003esrcu is not waited for.\n\nSuch a reader then locks a cleaned-up srcu_struct and keeps using ops\nafter the module that owns it is gone. rtnl_newlink() and\nrtnl_dump_ifinfo() both look up ops without RTNL, the latter for any\nuser that dumps links filtered by kind.\n\nWith delays added between the lookup and srcu_read_lock() in\nrtnl_link_ops_get(), and before rtnl_link_ops_put() in\nrtnl_dump_ifinfo(), running \"ip link show type dummy\" alongside\n\"rmmod dummy\" on a KASAN kernel gives:\n\n BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __srcu_read_unlock+0x57/0x70\n Read of size 8 at addr ffffffffc02ff318 by task ip/147\n Call Trace:\n __srcu_read_unlock+0x57/0x70\n rtnl_dump_ifinfo.cold+0x30/0x3b\n rtnl_dumpit+0x7a/0x1b0\n netlink_dump+0x486/0x11b0\n __netlink_dump_start+0x661/0x910\n rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x611/0x9e0\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x126/0x380\n netlink_unicast+0x605/0x830\n netlink_sendmsg+0x6d0/0xbb0\n __sys_sendto+0x335/0x3a0\n\nCall synchronize_rcu() before synchronize_srcu(), as\nrtnl_af_unregister() already does. This should be enough because\nrtnl_link_ops_get() is the only RCU walker of link_ops, and it takes\nops-\u003esrcu before rcu_read_unlock(), so every reader that found ops is\ncovered by synchronize_srcu() once the RCU grace period ends. The extra\ngrace period only costs time at module unload.\n\nReaders and the writer were serialized by RTNL until link_ops got its\nown mutex, which is why the missing RCU wait did not matter before.",
"id": "GHSA-p8q6-7938-6fjx",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99401"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b70edea393de445255da6c706eebb823117a955"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e3a6b707681a6291a410d1b7ce15840a9912a86"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee636421740bc47e9d9e612ca7c9fa7dc5d17be1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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