GHSA-P845-629J-RCJ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 16:36 – Updated: 2026-08-17 16:36Summary
The admin passkey reset endpoint lacked the role-level authorization check used by comparable privileged account-protection endpoints. A lower-privileged administrator could attempt passkey reset operations against same-level or higher-privileged users, including root-level accounts.
Impact
If the target account had a passkey configured, a lower-privileged administrator could remove that authentication factor and weaken the target account's protection boundary. The attacker still needed administrator privileges, so the issue is rated Medium.
Affected versions
The vulnerable admin passkey reset behavior was present from the passkey feature introduction in v0.9.1.3 through versions before v1.0.0-rc.7.
Patches
This issue is fixed in v1.0.0-rc.7. The fix adds a canManageTargetRole check to AdminResetPasskey before passkey lookup or deletion, preventing lower-privileged administrators from operating on same-level or higher-privileged users.
Workarounds
If upgrading immediately is not possible, restrict admin access to trusted operators only and block DELETE /api/user/:id/reset_passkey at the reverse proxy or gateway except for root operators.
References
- Fixed by commit
0936e2504655a5cbf7bc3c388f6d3e2bb24916d3. - Relevant code paths:
controller/passkey.go,controller/twofa.go, androuter/api-router.go.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.9.1.3"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-rc.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64866"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T16:36:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe admin passkey reset endpoint lacked the role-level authorization check used by comparable privileged account-protection endpoints. A lower-privileged administrator could attempt passkey reset operations against same-level or higher-privileged users, including root-level accounts.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the target account had a passkey configured, a lower-privileged administrator could remove that authentication factor and weaken the target account\u0027s protection boundary. The attacker still needed administrator privileges, so the issue is rated Medium.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nThe vulnerable admin passkey reset behavior was present from the passkey feature introduction in `v0.9.1.3` through versions before `v1.0.0-rc.7`.\n\n## Patches\n\nThis issue is fixed in `v1.0.0-rc.7`. The fix adds a `canManageTargetRole` check to `AdminResetPasskey` before passkey lookup or deletion, preventing lower-privileged administrators from operating on same-level or higher-privileged users.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading immediately is not possible, restrict admin access to trusted operators only and block `DELETE /api/user/:id/reset_passkey` at the reverse proxy or gateway except for root operators.\n\n## References\n\n- Fixed by commit `0936e2504655a5cbf7bc3c388f6d3e2bb24916d3`.\n- Relevant code paths: `controller/passkey.go`, `controller/twofa.go`, and `router/api-router.go`.",
"id": "GHSA-p845-629j-rcj6",
"modified": "2026-08-17T16:36:05Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T16:36:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/security/advisories/GHSA-p845-629j-rcj6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/pull/4929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/commit/0936e2504655a5cbf7bc3c388f6d3e2bb24916d3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/releases/tag/v1.0.0-rc.7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "New API: Admin can reset passkeys for same-level or higher-privileged users"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.