GHSA-P4CG-3328-RVFG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 14:53 – Updated: 2026-09-02 14:53Summary
Orval's zod schema generation emits the query-parameter default value as a module-level template literal
(export const …Default =;) without escaping ${ or the backtick. A default of the form
v${<code>}w injects a live JavaScript expression evaluated when the generated zod schema module is
imported, executing attacker-controlled code at import — no request or function call needed. Verified
on Orval 8.19.0; survives default OpenAPI validation.
Details
export const …Default = `v${globalThis.ORVPWN()}w`; // ${...} = arbitrary JS expression, runs at import
Malicious input: a query parameter with a default of v${<attacker JS>}w. ${...} permits any JS expression.
Note: this is one of several default-bearing positions that reach the same unescaped zod
template-literal sink; a single fix (escape default values) closes all of them, and a CNA may choose
to consolidate the related reports.
PoC
reproduce.sh (+ make_spec.py) attached: generates the zod schema with default validation, bundles
it, imports it, and shows a marker written at import. Verified on 8.19.0.
Impact
Code execution at import in any application that imports a zod schema module generated from an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description.
Suggested fix
Emit default values via a proper string-literal encoder (JSON.stringify, or escape backtick and ${
if a template literal must be used); never interpolate a spec value into a template literal. Apply to
every default position.
maintainer-report.txt
make_spec.py
reproduce.sh
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "orval"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.21.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72716"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1336"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:53:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T18:17:25Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOrval\u0027s zod schema generation emits the **query-parameter** `default` value as a module-level template literal\n(`export const \u2026Default = `\u003cdefault\u003e`;`) without escaping `${` or the backtick. A default of the form\n`v${\u003ccode\u003e}w` injects a live JavaScript expression evaluated when the generated zod schema module is\nimported, executing attacker-controlled code at import \u2014 no request or function call needed. Verified\non Orval 8.19.0; survives default OpenAPI validation.\n\n### Details\n\n```ts\nexport const \u2026Default = `v${globalThis.ORVPWN()}w`; // ${...} = arbitrary JS expression, runs at import\n```\n\nMalicious input: a query parameter with a `default` of `v${\u003cattacker JS\u003e}w`. `${...}` permits any JS expression.\n\nNote: this is one of several `default`-bearing positions that reach the same unescaped zod\ntemplate-literal sink; a single fix (escape `default` values) closes all of them, and a CNA may choose\nto consolidate the related reports.\n\n### PoC\n\n`reproduce.sh` (+ `make_spec.py`) attached: generates the zod schema with default validation, bundles\nit, imports it, and shows a marker written at import. Verified on 8.19.0.\n\n### Impact\n\nCode execution at import in any application that imports a zod schema module generated from an\nattacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nEmit `default` values via a proper string-literal encoder (JSON.stringify, or escape backtick and `${`\nif a template literal must be used); never interpolate a spec value into a template literal. Apply to\nevery `default` position.\n[maintainer-report.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29399067/maintainer-report.txt)\n[make_spec.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29399068/make_spec.py)\n[reproduce.sh](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29399069/reproduce.sh)",
"id": "GHSA-p4cg-3328-rvfg",
"modified": "2026-09-02T14:53:15Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T14:53:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/security/advisories/GHSA-p4cg-3328-rvfg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72716"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/pull/3692"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/commit/8ef1bfdf3f9bcaf9dabfbe2e42887f1c0e159ab6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/releases/tag/v8.21.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Orval: Import-time RCE via query-parameter default -\u003e zod module-level template literal"
}
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