GHSA-P436-GJF2-799P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 00:10 – Updated: 2026-03-31 14:21
VLAI
Summary
Docker CLI Plugins: Uncontrolled Search Path Element Leads to Local Privilege Escalation on Windows
Details

This issue affects Docker CLI through 29.1.5

Impact

Docker CLI for Windows searches for plugin binaries in C:\ProgramData\Docker\cli-plugins, a directory that does not exist by default. A low-privileged attacker can create this directory and place malicious CLI plugin binaries (docker-compose.exe, docker-buildx.exe, etc.) that are executed when a victim user opens Docker Desktop or invokes Docker CLI plugin features, and allow privilege-escalation if the docker CLI is executed as a privileged user.

This issue affects Docker CLI through v29.1.5 (fixed in v29.2.0). It impacts Windows binaries acting as a CLI plugin manager via the github.com/docker/cli/cli-plugins/manager package, which is consumed by downstream projects such as Docker Compose.

Docker Compose became affected starting in v2.31.0, when it incorporated the relevant CLI plugin manager code (see https://github.com/docker/compose/pull/12300), and is fixed in v5.1.0.

This issue does not impact non-Windows binaries or projects that do not use the plugin manager code.

Patches

Fixed version starts with 29.2.0

This issue was fixed in https://github.com/docker/cli/commit/13759330b1f7e7cb0d67047ea42c5482548ba7fa (https://github.com/docker/cli/pull/6713), which removed %PROGRAMDATA%\Docker\cli-plugins from the list of paths used for plugin-discovery on Windows.

Workarounds

None

Resources

  • Pull request: "cli-plugins/manager: remove legacy system-wide cli-plugin path" (https://github.com/docker/cli/pull/6713)
  • Patch: https://github.com/docker/cli/commit/13759330b1f7e7cb0d67047ea42c5482548ba7fa.patch

Credits

Nitesh Surana (niteshsurana.com) of Trend Research of TrendAI

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/docker/cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "19.03.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "29.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-15558"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-427"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T00:10:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-04T17:16:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "This issue affects Docker CLI through 29.1.5\n\n### Impact\n\nDocker CLI for Windows searches for plugin binaries in `C:\\ProgramData\\Docker\\cli-plugins`, a directory that does not exist by default. A low-privileged attacker can create this directory and place malicious CLI plugin binaries (docker-compose.exe, docker-buildx.exe, etc.) that are executed when a victim user opens Docker Desktop or invokes Docker CLI plugin features, and allow privilege-escalation if the `docker` CLI is executed as a privileged user.\n\nThis issue affects Docker CLI through v29.1.5 (fixed in v29.2.0). It impacts Windows binaries acting as a CLI plugin manager via the [`github.com/docker/cli/cli-plugins/manager`](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/docker/cli@v29.1.5+incompatible/cli-plugins/manager) package, which is consumed by downstream projects such as Docker Compose.\n\nDocker Compose became affected starting in v2.31.0, when it incorporated the relevant CLI plugin manager code (see https://github.com/docker/compose/pull/12300), and is fixed in v5.1.0.\n\nThis issue does not impact non-Windows binaries or projects that do not use the plugin manager code.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed version starts with 29.2.0\n\nThis issue was fixed in https://github.com/docker/cli/commit/13759330b1f7e7cb0d67047ea42c5482548ba7fa (https://github.com/docker/cli/pull/6713), which removed `%PROGRAMDATA%\\Docker\\cli-plugins` from the list of paths used for plugin-discovery on Windows.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone\n\n### Resources\n\n- Pull request: \"cli-plugins/manager: remove legacy system-wide cli-plugin path\" (https://github.com/docker/cli/pull/6713)\n- Patch: https://github.com/docker/cli/commit/13759330b1f7e7cb0d67047ea42c5482548ba7fa.patch\n\n### Credits\n\nNitesh Surana (niteshsurana.com) of Trend Research of TrendAI",
  "id": "GHSA-p436-gjf2-799p",
  "modified": "2026-03-31T14:21:14Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T00:10:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docker/cli/security/advisories/GHSA-p436-gjf2-799p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15558"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docker/cli/pull/6713"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docker/compose/pull/12300"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docker/cli/commit/13759330b1f7e7cb0d67047ea42c5482548ba7fa"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/docker/cli"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-CAN-28304"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Docker CLI Plugins: Uncontrolled Search Path Element Leads to Local Privilege Escalation on Windows"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.