GHSA-P3Q9-QQP5-6666
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-03 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: skip the zoned limits update if the zone info query failed
nvme_query_zone_info() returns either a negative errno or a positive NVMe status code, but nvme_update_ns_info_block() only tests for the negative case:
ret = nvme_query_zone_info(ns, lbaf, &zi);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
If the device fails the Identify Namespace (I/O Command Set specific) command, or the Identify Controller command issued by nvme_set_max_append(), the positive status falls through and setup continues with the zero-initialized zone info. nvme_update_zone_info() then marks the queue zoned with chunk_sectors and ns->head->zsze set to zero.
blk_validate_zoned_limits() does not check chunk_sectors, so the limits commit succeeds. blk_revalidate_disk_zones() does reject the zero zone size, but by then the limits are live and nothing rolls them back, so I/O keeps being submitted to a zoned queue with a zero zone size and disk_zone_no() shifts by ilog2(0):
nvme0n1: Invalid non power of two zone size (0) UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in include/linux/blkdev.h:747:16 shift exponent -1 is negative disk_zone_no include/linux/blkdev.h:747 [inline] bio_straddles_zones include/linux/blkdev.h:1058 [inline] blk_zone_wplug_handle_write block/blk-zoned.c:1423 [inline] blk_zone_plug_bio.cold+0x25/0x1c8 block/blk-zoned.c:1605 blk_mq_submit_bio+0x18fb/0x2870 block/blk-mq.c:3196 submit_bh_wbc+0x575/0x740 fs/buffer.c:2824 __block_write_full_folio+0x728/0xdd0 fs/buffer.c:1933
Any device, firmware or NVMe-oF target that fails this one command reaches this.
Skip the zoned limits update in that case, and log which of the two things happened: during a revalidation the queue keeps the zone geometry it was last validated with, and on a first scan the namespace is registered without zoned limits, so that it is still available as a handle for admin commands. Neither of the paths in nvme_query_zone_info() that return a positive status logs anything, so the failure would otherwise be silent.
zi.zone_size is an exact indicator: every path that returns a positive status returns before it is assigned, and after that the only failure left is -ENODEV, which the caller already handles.
Found by FuzzNvme.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89971"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:17:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme: skip the zoned limits update if the zone info query failed\n\nnvme_query_zone_info() returns either a negative errno or a positive\nNVMe status code, but nvme_update_ns_info_block() only tests for the\nnegative case:\n\n\tret = nvme_query_zone_info(ns, lbaf, \u0026zi);\n\tif (ret \u003c 0)\n\t\tgoto out;\n\nIf the device fails the Identify Namespace (I/O Command Set specific)\ncommand, or the Identify Controller command issued by\nnvme_set_max_append(), the positive status falls through and setup\ncontinues with the zero-initialized zone info. nvme_update_zone_info()\nthen marks the queue zoned with chunk_sectors and ns-\u003ehead-\u003ezsze set to\nzero.\n\nblk_validate_zoned_limits() does not check chunk_sectors, so the limits\ncommit succeeds. blk_revalidate_disk_zones() does reject the zero zone\nsize, but by then the limits are live and nothing rolls them back, so\nI/O keeps being submitted to a zoned queue with a zero zone size and\ndisk_zone_no() shifts by ilog2(0):\n\n nvme0n1: Invalid non power of two zone size (0)\n UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in include/linux/blkdev.h:747:16\n shift exponent -1 is negative\n disk_zone_no include/linux/blkdev.h:747 [inline]\n bio_straddles_zones include/linux/blkdev.h:1058 [inline]\n blk_zone_wplug_handle_write block/blk-zoned.c:1423 [inline]\n blk_zone_plug_bio.cold+0x25/0x1c8 block/blk-zoned.c:1605\n blk_mq_submit_bio+0x18fb/0x2870 block/blk-mq.c:3196\n submit_bh_wbc+0x575/0x740 fs/buffer.c:2824\n __block_write_full_folio+0x728/0xdd0 fs/buffer.c:1933\n\nAny device, firmware or NVMe-oF target that fails this one command\nreaches this.\n\nSkip the zoned limits update in that case, and log which of the two\nthings happened: during a revalidation the queue keeps the zone\ngeometry it was last validated with, and on a first scan the namespace\nis registered without zoned limits, so that it is still available as a\nhandle for admin commands. Neither of the paths in\nnvme_query_zone_info() that return a positive status logs anything, so\nthe failure would otherwise be silent.\n\nzi.zone_size is an exact indicator: every path that returns a positive\nstatus returns before it is assigned, and after that the only failure\nleft is -ENODEV, which the caller already handles.\n\nFound by FuzzNvme.",
"id": "GHSA-p3q9-qqp5-6666",
"modified": "2026-10-03T12:31:07Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89971"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3838e80fcfb32e62baffb63c6dc0a60153665a4d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7fad53ae2052a2b4fc7ca567d6555bdb1176ba35"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a75258e651d91ec25424cd94d824d192c11ccc24"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb6dafa79040357cf5043836e1db108c2af8b1e1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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