GHSA-P28W-6J9H-MMP2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfs: fix memory leak in xfs_dqinode_metadir_create()

If xfs_metadir_create() fails in xfs_dqinode_metadir_create(), the current code returns directly, leaking the allocated update and transaction state. If the subsequent commit fails, the caller-owned inode reference is left behind.

Fix this memory leak by routing the create failure path through xfs_metadir_cancel(). For both create and commit failures, finish and release any inode returned to the caller, mirroring the unwind pattern in xfs_metadir_mkdir().

The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1.1.

An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. Runtime validation used kprobe fault injection during mount -o uquota on a metadir XFS image. Injecting xfs_metadir_create() reproduced the old active-update path that left mount stuck later in mount setup; after this change, the same injection reported cancel_hits=1 and irele_hits=1. Injecting xfs_metadir_commit() exercised the old inode-reference leak path; after this change, it reported irele_hits=1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64356"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-401"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfs: fix memory leak in xfs_dqinode_metadir_create()\n\nIf xfs_metadir_create() fails in xfs_dqinode_metadir_create(), the current\ncode returns directly, leaking the allocated update and transaction state.\nIf the subsequent commit fails, the caller-owned inode reference is left\nbehind.\n\nFix this memory leak by routing the create failure path through\nxfs_metadir_cancel().  For both create and commit failures, finish and\nrelease any inode returned to the caller, mirroring the unwind pattern in\nxfs_metadir_mkdir().\n\nThe bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are\ndeveloping for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing\nv6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly\navailable. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still\npresent in v7.1.1.\n\nAn x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. Runtime validation\nused kprobe fault injection during `mount -o uquota` on a metadir XFS\nimage. Injecting xfs_metadir_create() reproduced the old active-update path\nthat left mount stuck later in mount setup; after this change, the same\ninjection reported cancel_hits=1 and irele_hits=1. Injecting\nxfs_metadir_commit() exercised the old inode-reference leak path; after\nthis change, it reported irele_hits=1.",
  "id": "GHSA-p28w-6j9h-mmp2",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T18:31:11Z",
  "published": "2026-07-25T12:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64356"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/06a2e6dbaa26c0740ac76dfa66b0aedc78d05820"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45de375b25060edf46e20abb36521ba530336ceb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c3d3d2212c2966973dd7d603c6c6e6ed6fc7fbe1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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