GHSA-P279-5WCV-45VQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 18:05 – Updated: 2026-10-07 18:05Summary
The MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched
case-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded
as webshell.pHp therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible
upload directory as webshell.php, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated
backend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.
Details
FileHandler::getFilePath() rewrote blacklisted extensions to .txt using a
case-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored
name — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation
happened after it.
Two further weaknesses contributed:
- The default blacklist contained only
phpandhtaccess, leaving other server-executable extensions (phtml,php5,phar,shtml,cgi, …) unblocked regardless of casing. - Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.
Impact
An authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the web server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without authentication, giving arbitrary code execution as the web server user.
Patches
Fixed in kunstmaan/media-bundle 7.3.2. The extension is now normalised before it is
checked and compared with in_array(); the default blacklist is expanded to the full
set of server-executable extensions; and a new opt-in allowed_extensions option allows
projects to enforce a strict allow-list.
Note that the patch does not rename files already stored on disk. Sites should audit their media upload directory for existing files with an executable extension.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, configure the web server to refuse to execute scripts in the
media upload directory (for example a location block in nginx or php_flag engine off
in Apache).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "kunstmaan/media-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "kunstmaan/bundles-cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-104890"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T18:05:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-05T16:17:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched\ncase-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded\nas `webshell.pHp` therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible\nupload directory as `webshell.php`, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated\nbackend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\n`FileHandler::getFilePath()` rewrote blacklisted extensions to `.txt` using a\ncase-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored\nname \u2014 so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation\nhappened after it.\n\nTwo further weaknesses contributed:\n\n* The default blacklist contained only `php` and `htaccess`, leaving other\n server-executable extensions (`phtml`, `php5`, `phar`, `shtml`, `cgi`, \u2026) unblocked\n regardless of casing.\n* Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the\nweb server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without\nauthentication, giving arbitrary code execution as the web server user.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in kunstmaan/media-bundle 7.3.2. The extension is now normalised before it is\nchecked and compared with `in_array()`; the default blacklist is expanded to the full\nset of server-executable extensions; and a new opt-in `allowed_extensions` option allows\nprojects to enforce a strict allow-list.\n\nNote that the patch does not rename files already stored on disk. Sites should audit\ntheir media upload directory for existing files with an executable extension.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade, configure the web server to refuse to execute scripts in the\nmedia upload directory (for example a `location` block in nginx or `php_flag engine off`\nin Apache).",
"id": "GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq",
"modified": "2026-10-07T18:05:38Z",
"published": "2026-10-07T18:05:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Kunstmaan/KunstmaanBundlesCMS/security/advisories/GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Kunstmaan/KunstmaanBundlesCMS/commit/1bbdfdeac8e7e91506b1a9271360b9b68d7690d3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Kunstmaan/KunstmaanBundlesCMS"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Kunstmaan/KunstmaanBundlesCMS/releases/tag/7.3.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Kunstmaan CMS: MediaBundle extension blacklist bypass allows authenticated administrators to upload executable PHP files leading to remote code execution"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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