GHSA-MXQW-697J-9CV7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-27 03:34 – Updated: 2026-06-01 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: ufs: core: Fix use-after free in init error and remove paths

devm_blk_crypto_profile_init() registers a cleanup handler to run when the associated (platform-) device is being released. For UFS, the crypto private data and pointers are stored as part of the ufs_hba's data structure 'struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile'. This structure is allocated as part of the underlying ufshcd and therefore Scsi_host allocation.

During driver release or during error handling in ufshcd_pltfrm_init(), this structure is released as part of ufshcd_dealloc_host() before the (platform-) device associated with the crypto call above is released. Once this device is released, the crypto cleanup code will run, using the just-released 'struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile'. This causes a use-after-free situation:

Call trace: kfree+0x60/0x2d8 (P) kvfree+0x44/0x60 blk_crypto_profile_destroy_callback+0x28/0x70 devm_action_release+0x1c/0x30 release_nodes+0x6c/0x108 devres_release_all+0x98/0x100 device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x70 really_probe+0x218/0x2d0

In other words, the initialisation code flow is:

platform-device probe ufshcd_pltfrm_init() ufshcd_alloc_host() scsi_host_alloc() allocation of struct ufs_hba creation of scsi-host devices devm_blk_crypto_profile_init() devm registration of cleanup handler using platform-device

and during error handling of ufshcd_pltfrm_init() or during driver removal:

ufshcd_dealloc_host() scsi_host_put() put_device(scsi-host) release of struct ufs_hba put_device(platform-device) crypto cleanup handler

To fix this use-after free, change ufshcd_alloc_host() to register a devres action to automatically cleanup the underlying SCSI device on ufshcd destruction, without requiring explicit calls to ufshcd_dealloc_host(). This way:

* the crypto profile and all other ufs_hba-owned resources are
  destroyed before SCSI (as they've been registered after)
* a memleak is plugged in tc-dwc-g210-pci.c remove() as a
  side-effect
* EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ufshcd_dealloc_host) can be removed fully as
  it's not needed anymore
* no future drivers using ufshcd_alloc_host() could ever forget
  adding the cleanup
Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-21739"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-416"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-27T03:15:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: ufs: core: Fix use-after free in init error and remove paths\n\ndevm_blk_crypto_profile_init() registers a cleanup handler to run when\nthe associated (platform-) device is being released. For UFS, the\ncrypto private data and pointers are stored as part of the ufs_hba\u0027s\ndata structure \u0027struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile\u0027. This structure is\nallocated as part of the underlying ufshcd and therefore Scsi_host\nallocation.\n\nDuring driver release or during error handling in ufshcd_pltfrm_init(),\nthis structure is released as part of ufshcd_dealloc_host() before the\n(platform-) device associated with the crypto call above is released.\nOnce this device is released, the crypto cleanup code will run, using\nthe just-released \u0027struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile\u0027. This causes a\nuse-after-free situation:\n\n  Call trace:\n   kfree+0x60/0x2d8 (P)\n   kvfree+0x44/0x60\n   blk_crypto_profile_destroy_callback+0x28/0x70\n   devm_action_release+0x1c/0x30\n   release_nodes+0x6c/0x108\n   devres_release_all+0x98/0x100\n   device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x70\n   really_probe+0x218/0x2d0\n\nIn other words, the initialisation code flow is:\n\n  platform-device probe\n    ufshcd_pltfrm_init()\n      ufshcd_alloc_host()\n        scsi_host_alloc()\n          allocation of struct ufs_hba\n          creation of scsi-host devices\n    devm_blk_crypto_profile_init()\n      devm registration of cleanup handler using platform-device\n\nand during error handling of ufshcd_pltfrm_init() or during driver\nremoval:\n\n  ufshcd_dealloc_host()\n    scsi_host_put()\n      put_device(scsi-host)\n        release of struct ufs_hba\n  put_device(platform-device)\n    crypto cleanup handler\n\nTo fix this use-after free, change ufshcd_alloc_host() to register a\ndevres action to automatically cleanup the underlying SCSI device on\nufshcd destruction, without requiring explicit calls to\nufshcd_dealloc_host(). This way:\n\n    * the crypto profile and all other ufs_hba-owned resources are\n      destroyed before SCSI (as they\u0027ve been registered after)\n    * a memleak is plugged in tc-dwc-g210-pci.c remove() as a\n      side-effect\n    * EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ufshcd_dealloc_host) can be removed fully as\n      it\u0027s not needed anymore\n    * no future drivers using ufshcd_alloc_host() could ever forget\n      adding the cleanup",
  "id": "GHSA-mxqw-697j-9cv7",
  "modified": "2026-06-01T18:31:19Z",
  "published": "2025-02-27T03:34:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21739"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a6895c03b1f439236e2d22b1a69ebfc1eb9d5ea"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c77c0d754fe83cb154715fcfec6c3faef94f207"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0dc539b888fb5f56b6eeddd95433eab557d4b0c1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c185beae09a3eb85f54777edafa227f7e03075d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d06eb2620d3bf16056b8b7ea3744dbb5e30512f4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8fb2403ddebb5eea0033d90d9daae4c88749ada"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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