GHSA-MWMJ-CW5C-JG28
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: timer: Clear SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD once the close completes
snd_timer_close_locked() marks an instance with SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD and returns early when the flag is already set, but the flag is never cleared again. A completed close ends in remove_slave_links(), which leaves timeri->timer NULL, so a second close is already harmless through the timer == NULL path; the early return can only be reached by an instance that was opened again in between. For such an instance the close unlinks nothing, so snd_timer_instance_free() frees an object that is still on timer->open_list_head, still on snd_timer_master_list if it was opened with a slave key, still owns any adopted slaves, and still holds its timer and module references.
snd_seq_timer_open() reopens an instance exactly like that: it retries its fallback open on the same object after a failure that has already run snd_timer_close_locked() internally. An unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/timer and /dev/snd/seq can force that failure, since snd_timer_check_master() returns -EBUSY when a pending slave matches the new master's (slave_class, slave_id) key and the target timer has reached max_instances, and SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT with dev_class = SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_SLAVE keeps the caller-supplied dev_sclass, so a sequencer queue's key can be forged. The freed instance is afterwards dereferenced by any further snd_timer_open() on that timer, by snd_timer_check_slave(), and by /proc/asound/timers, which faults on the stale ti->owner pointer.
The flag only has to be visible while the close is in progress, which is all its other users need. Clear it in remove_slave_links(), under the same timer->lock that sets it, once the instance is off every list.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74503"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T13:17:55Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: timer: Clear SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD once the close completes\n\nsnd_timer_close_locked() marks an instance with SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD\nand returns early when the flag is already set, but the flag is never\ncleared again. A completed close ends in remove_slave_links(), which\nleaves timeri-\u003etimer NULL, so a second close is already harmless through\nthe timer == NULL path; the early return can only be reached by an\ninstance that was opened again in between. For such an instance the\nclose unlinks nothing, so snd_timer_instance_free() frees an object that\nis still on timer-\u003eopen_list_head, still on snd_timer_master_list if it\nwas opened with a slave key, still owns any adopted slaves, and still\nholds its timer and module references.\n\nsnd_seq_timer_open() reopens an instance exactly like that: it retries\nits fallback open on the same object after a failure that has already\nrun snd_timer_close_locked() internally. An unprivileged user with\naccess to /dev/snd/timer and /dev/snd/seq can force that failure, since\nsnd_timer_check_master() returns -EBUSY when a pending slave matches the\nnew master\u0027s (slave_class, slave_id) key and the target timer has\nreached max_instances, and SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT with dev_class =\nSNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_SLAVE keeps the caller-supplied dev_sclass, so a\nsequencer queue\u0027s key can be forged. The freed instance is afterwards\ndereferenced by any further snd_timer_open() on that timer, by\nsnd_timer_check_slave(), and by /proc/asound/timers, which faults on the\nstale ti-\u003eowner pointer.\n\nThe flag only has to be visible while the close is in progress, which is\nall its other users need. Clear it in remove_slave_links(), under the\nsame timer-\u003elock that sets it, once the instance is off every list.",
"id": "GHSA-mwmj-cw5c-jg28",
"modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:50Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T15:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74503"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c561fab50991df10b1e4daca25886c34a2a9c07"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a26a2e52736f9e39843ca66a2e1ce6bf1adbcd1e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb016091010ec401a06e6bdace0cd944ee03d371"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2744d5f3aea474513fd2298daecb94a952ce441"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.