GHSA-MW6P-33VW-46CC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 16:38 – Updated: 2026-07-15 16:38
VLAI
Summary
MantisBT: SQL Injection via history_order Configuration Value
Details

MantisBT 2.28.3 and earlier versions contains a SQL injection vulnerability in core/history_api.php. The history_order configuration value is concatenated directly into a SQL ORDER BY clause without any sanitisation, parameterization, or validation against a whitelist.

An administrator can set this configuration value via the web UI (adm_config_set.php) or the REST API (PATCH /api/rest/config). The injected SQL then executes whenever any user views a bug with history entries.

Impact

  • Sensitive data extraction from the entire bugtracker database including user credentials (cookie_string, password hashes), API tokens, and private issue data
  • With MySQL FILE privilege: full RCE via INTO OUTFILE writing a PHP webshell to the web root
  • The admin plants the payload once; any authenticated user viewing a bug with history triggers the injection

Patches

  • https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/6ad20bea2e01f33c6e4170775ae4d9dbe2c75325

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

Resources

  • https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=37123

Credits

McCaulay Hudson (@McCaulay) of watchTowr

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.28.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "mantisbt/mantisbt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.28.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47142"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-15T16:38:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "MantisBT 2.28.3 and earlier versions contains a SQL injection vulnerability in core/history_api.php. The history_order configuration value is concatenated directly into a SQL ORDER BY clause without any sanitisation, parameterization, or validation against a whitelist.\n\nAn administrator can set this configuration value via the web UI (adm_config_set.php) or the REST API (PATCH /api/rest/config). The injected SQL then executes whenever any user views a bug with history entries.\n\n### Impact\n- Sensitive data extraction from the entire bugtracker database including user credentials (cookie_string, password hashes), API tokens, and private issue data\n- With MySQL FILE privilege: full RCE via INTO OUTFILE writing a PHP webshell to the web root\n- The admin plants the payload once; any authenticated user viewing a bug with history triggers the injection\n\n### Patches\n- https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/6ad20bea2e01f33c6e4170775ae4d9dbe2c75325\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\n### Resources\n- https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=37123\n\n### Credits\nMcCaulay Hudson (@McCaulay) of watchTowr",
  "id": "GHSA-mw6p-33vw-46cc",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T16:38:22Z",
  "published": "2026-07-15T16:38:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/security/advisories/GHSA-mw6p-33vw-46cc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/6ad20bea2e01f33c6e4170775ae4d9dbe2c75325"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=37123"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MantisBT: SQL Injection via history_order Configuration Value"
}



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