GHSA-MVPX-42X3-8643
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-03 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: Fix UAF of btusb_data by rx_work
btusb_close() and btusb_flush() cancel data->rx_work with the asynchronous cancel_delayed_work(), so if btusb_rx_work() is already running on another CPU it keeps running after the cancel returns.
btusb_disconnect() calls hci_unregister_dev(), which invokes btusb_close(), and then frees the btusb_data. A still running btusb_rx_work() then dereferences the freed data:
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&data->acl_q)))
data->recv_acl(data->hdev, skb);
Use cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead. In btusb_close() the cancel also has to happen after btusb_stop_traffic(), otherwise an URB completion racing with the cancel can requeue the work right after it has been waited for.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97977"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:25Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: btusb: Fix UAF of btusb_data by rx_work\n\nbtusb_close() and btusb_flush() cancel data-\u003erx_work with the\nasynchronous cancel_delayed_work(), so if btusb_rx_work() is already\nrunning on another CPU it keeps running after the cancel returns.\n\nbtusb_disconnect() calls hci_unregister_dev(), which invokes\nbtusb_close(), and then frees the btusb_data. A still running\nbtusb_rx_work() then dereferences the freed data:\n\n\twhile ((skb = skb_dequeue(\u0026data-\u003eacl_q)))\n\t\tdata-\u003erecv_acl(data-\u003ehdev, skb);\n\nUse cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead. In btusb_close() the cancel also\nhas to happen after btusb_stop_traffic(), otherwise an URB completion\nracing with the cancel can requeue the work right after it has been\nwaited for.",
"id": "GHSA-mvpx-42x3-8643",
"modified": "2026-10-03T12:31:22Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97977"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c12c3117639e78940959d956519c758c57d0849"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/472d005622525b7be155cac99dde2252b0163bd1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5242050195a711e9cd6a9935f689ab6656b94a91"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93b59937bda3fffc6386c79f5544a39bc680c8e8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa391adb9c755515a89993634745e9079e5ef37c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc654a72a8d979db15e2773a481e931abaf5a9e8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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