GHSA-MRF2-HC9C-229V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: bail out on template ct in get eval
I noticed this issue while looking at a historic syzbot report 1.
A rule like the one below is enough to trigger the bug:
table ip t {
chain pre {
type filter hook prerouting priority raw;
ct zone set 1
ct original saddr 1.2.3.4 accept
}
}
The first expression attaches a per-cpu template ct via nft_ct_set_zone_eval() (nf_ct_tmpl_alloc -> kzalloc, tuple is all zero, nf_ct_l3num(ct) == 0). The next expression then calls nft_ct_get_eval() on the same skb, treats the template as a real ct and hits the 16-byte memcpy path. With dreg at NFT_REG32_15 this overflows past struct nft_regs on the kernel stack; with smaller dreg values it silently clobbers adjacent registers.
Reject template ct at the eval entry and in nft_ct_get_fast_eval(), mirroring the check nft_ct_set_eval() already has. Additionally, bound the address copy in NFT_CT_SRC / NFT_CT_DST by priv->len instead of by nf_ct_l3num(ct): nf_ct_get_tuple() zeroes the tuple before pkt_to_tuple() fills in only the protocol-relevant leading bytes, so the trailing bytes of tuple->{src,dst}.u3.all are well-defined zero. priv->len is validated at rule load, so the copy size is now bounded by the destination register rather than by an untrusted field on the conntrack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53267"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-121",
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nft_ct: bail out on template ct in get eval\n\nI noticed this issue while looking at a historic syzbot report [1].\n\nA rule like the one below is enough to trigger the bug:\n\n table ip t {\n chain pre {\n type filter hook prerouting priority raw;\n ct zone set 1\n ct original saddr 1.2.3.4 accept\n }\n }\n\nThe first expression attaches a per-cpu template ct via\nnft_ct_set_zone_eval() (nf_ct_tmpl_alloc -\u003e kzalloc, tuple is all\nzero, nf_ct_l3num(ct) == 0). The next expression then calls\nnft_ct_get_eval() on the same skb, treats the template as a real ct\nand hits the 16-byte memcpy path. With dreg at NFT_REG32_15 this\noverflows past struct nft_regs on the kernel stack; with smaller\ndreg values it silently clobbers adjacent registers.\n\nReject template ct at the eval entry and in nft_ct_get_fast_eval(),\nmirroring the check nft_ct_set_eval() already has. Additionally,\nbound the address copy in NFT_CT_SRC / NFT_CT_DST by priv-\u003elen\ninstead of by nf_ct_l3num(ct): nf_ct_get_tuple() zeroes the tuple\nbefore pkt_to_tuple() fills in only the protocol-relevant leading\nbytes, so the trailing bytes of tuple-\u003e{src,dst}.u3.all are\nwell-defined zero. priv-\u003elen is validated at rule load, so the\ncopy size is now bounded by the destination register rather than\nby an untrusted field on the conntrack.\n\n[1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=389cf09cb72926114fce90dc85a2c3231dcb647c",
"id": "GHSA-mrf2-hc9c-229v",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:45Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T09:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53267"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15bf8091f424f97ed8bfd2385f9fca3203f27be2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e154b5f53f1b0b490c7b8b02499f90feb86b1d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3027ecbdb5fdf9200251c21d4818e4c447ef78e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8470f676eadeab99132708acb1a85915664d6115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af80f78ce984649e1698b841cd33f4fa505ad828"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f071b0bf078146368d18e4eec386bf2ddc0ab7e0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.