GHSA-MR7M-3G53-Q257
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-21 21:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption
Doing an async decryption (large read) crashes with a slab-use-after-free way down in the crypto API.
Reproducer: # mount.cifs -o ...,seal,esize=1 //srv/share /mnt # dd if=/mnt/largefile of=/dev/null ... [ 194.196391] ================================================================== [ 194.196844] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.197269] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112bd0448 by task kworker/u77:2/899 [ 194.197707] [ 194.197818] CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 899 Comm: kworker/u77:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-lku-00028-gfca3ca14a17a-dirty #43 [ 194.198400] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 194.199046] Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs] [ 194.200032] Call Trace: [ 194.200191] [ 194.200327] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 [ 194.200558] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.200809] print_report+0x174/0x505 [ 194.201040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 194.201352] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.201604] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xdf/0x1c0 [ 194.201868] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202128] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150 [ 194.202361] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202616] gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202863] ghash_update+0x184/0x210 [ 194.203103] shash_ahash_update+0x184/0x2a0 [ 194.203377] ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10 [ 194.203651] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.203877] ? crypto_gcm_init_common+0x1ba/0x340 [ 194.204142] gcm_hash_assoc_remain_continue+0x10a/0x140 [ 194.204434] crypt_message+0xec1/0x10a0 [cifs] [ 194.206489] ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 194.208507] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.209205] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.209925] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.210443] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.211037] decrypt_raw_data+0x15f/0x250 [cifs] [ 194.212906] ? __pfx_decrypt_raw_data+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 194.214670] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.215193] smb2_decrypt_offload+0x12a/0x6c0 [cifs]
This is because TFM is being used in parallel.
Fix this by allocating a new AEAD TFM for async decryption, but keep the existing one for synchronous READ cases (similar to what is done in smb3_calc_signature()).
Also remove the calls to aead_request_set_callback() and crypto_wait_req() since it's always going to be a synchronous operation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50047"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-21T20:15:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix UAF in async decryption\n\nDoing an async decryption (large read) crashes with a\nslab-use-after-free way down in the crypto API.\n\nReproducer:\n # mount.cifs -o ...,seal,esize=1 //srv/share /mnt\n # dd if=/mnt/largefile of=/dev/null\n ...\n [ 194.196391] ==================================================================\n [ 194.196844] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110\n [ 194.197269] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112bd0448 by task kworker/u77:2/899\n [ 194.197707]\n [ 194.197818] CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 899 Comm: kworker/u77:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-lku-00028-gfca3ca14a17a-dirty #43\n [ 194.198400] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n [ 194.199046] Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs]\n [ 194.200032] Call Trace:\n [ 194.200191] \u003cTASK\u003e\n [ 194.200327] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70\n [ 194.200558] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110\n [ 194.200809] print_report+0x174/0x505\n [ 194.201040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10\n [ 194.201352] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n [ 194.201604] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xdf/0x1c0\n [ 194.201868] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110\n [ 194.202128] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150\n [ 194.202361] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110\n [ 194.202616] gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110\n [ 194.202863] ghash_update+0x184/0x210\n [ 194.203103] shash_ahash_update+0x184/0x2a0\n [ 194.203377] ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10\n [ 194.203651] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n [ 194.203877] ? crypto_gcm_init_common+0x1ba/0x340\n [ 194.204142] gcm_hash_assoc_remain_continue+0x10a/0x140\n [ 194.204434] crypt_message+0xec1/0x10a0 [cifs]\n [ 194.206489] ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n [ 194.208507] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n [ 194.209205] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n [ 194.209925] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n [ 194.210443] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n [ 194.211037] decrypt_raw_data+0x15f/0x250 [cifs]\n [ 194.212906] ? __pfx_decrypt_raw_data+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n [ 194.214670] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n [ 194.215193] smb2_decrypt_offload+0x12a/0x6c0 [cifs]\n\nThis is because TFM is being used in parallel.\n\nFix this by allocating a new AEAD TFM for async decryption, but keep\nthe existing one for synchronous READ cases (similar to what is done\nin smb3_calc_signature()).\n\nAlso remove the calls to aead_request_set_callback() and\ncrypto_wait_req() since it\u0027s always going to be a synchronous operation.",
"id": "GHSA-mr7m-3g53-q257",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:31:28Z",
"published": "2024-10-21T21:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50047"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0809fb86ad13b29e1d6d491364fc7ea4fb545995"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/538c26d9bf70c90edc460d18c81008a4e555925a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f14a476abba13144df5434871a7225fd29af633"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0abcd65ec545701b8793e12bc27dc98042b151a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bce966530fd5542bbb422cb45ecb775f7a1a6bc3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef51c0d544b1518b35364480317ab6d3468f205d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/03/msg00001.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00030.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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