GHSA-MR34-8733-GRR2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-14 22:09 – Updated: 2026-03-12 11:00Summary
Access Tokens are used to authenticate application access. When a user changes their password, the existing list of Access Tokens stay valid instead of expiring. If a user finds that their account has been compromised, they can update their password.
The bad actor though will still have access to their account because the bad actor's Access Token stays on the list as a valid token. The user will have to manually delete the bad actor's Access Token to secure their account. The list of Access Tokens has a generic Description which makes it hard to pinpoint a bad actor in a list of Access Tokens.
Details
To improve Memos security, all Access Tokens will need to be revoked when a user changes their password. This removes the session for all the user's devices and prompts the user to log in again. You can treat the old Access Tokens as "invalid" because those Access Tokens were created with the older password.
PoC
- Have 2 devices on hand
- Log onto your Memos account on both devices. Notice how Access Tokens are created for each.
- On one device, successfully change the password. Refresh the page on the 2nd device and notice how it doesn't log out the user.
- On the 2nd device, change the password again. Refresh the page on the 1st device and notice how it doesn't log out the user.
Impact
A bad actor will still have access to the user's account because the Access Token does not expire on a password update. Having multi-factor authentication will vastly improve account security in Account Takeover cases instead of just relying on a password.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.18.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/usememos/memos"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.18.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-21635"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-14T22:09:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-14T15:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAccess Tokens are used to authenticate application access. When a user changes their password, the existing list of Access Tokens stay valid instead of expiring. If a user finds that their account has been compromised, they can update their password. \n\nThe bad actor though will still have access to their account because the bad actor\u0027s Access Token stays on the list as a valid token. The user will have to manually delete the bad actor\u0027s Access Token to secure their account. The list of Access Tokens has a generic Description which makes it hard to pinpoint a bad actor in a list of Access Tokens. \n\n### Details\n\nTo improve Memos security, all Access Tokens will need to be revoked when a user changes their password. This removes the session for all the user\u0027s devices and prompts the user to log in again. You can treat the old Access Tokens as \"invalid\" because those Access Tokens were created with the older password.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Have 2 devices on hand\n2. Log onto your Memos account on both devices. Notice how Access Tokens are created for each.\n3. On one device, successfully change the password. Refresh the page on the 2nd device and notice how it doesn\u0027t log out the user.\n4. On the 2nd device, change the password again. Refresh the page on the 1st device and notice how it doesn\u0027t log out the user.\n\n### Impact\n\nA bad actor will still have access to the user\u0027s account because the Access Token does not expire on a password update. Having multi-factor authentication will vastly improve account security in Account Takeover cases instead of just relying on a password.",
"id": "GHSA-mr34-8733-grr2",
"modified": "2026-03-12T11:00:01Z",
"published": "2025-11-14T22:09:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/usememos/memos/security/advisories/GHSA-mr34-8733-grr2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21635"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/usememos/memos"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/usememos/memos/releases/tag/v0.18.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://owasp.org/Top10/A04_2021-Insecure_Design"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://owasp.org/Top10/A07_2021-Identification_and_Authentication_Failures"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Memos\u0027 Access Tokens Stay Valid after User Password Change"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.