GHSA-MQQF-QF5C-JG26
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-27 03:34 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:34In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: handle NULL sock pointer in l2cap_sock_alloc
A NULL sock pointer is passed into l2cap_sock_alloc() when it is called from l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() and the error handling paths should also be aware of it.
Seemingly a more elegant solution would be to swap bt_sock_alloc() and l2cap_chan_create() calls since they are not interdependent to that moment but then l2cap_chan_create() adds the soon to be deallocated and still dummy-initialized channel to the global list accessible by many L2CAP paths. The channel would be removed from the list in short period of time but be a bit more straight-forward here and just check for NULL instead of changing the order of function calls.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE static analysis tool.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-58009"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-27T03:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: handle NULL sock pointer in l2cap_sock_alloc\n\nA NULL sock pointer is passed into l2cap_sock_alloc() when it is called\nfrom l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() and the error handling paths should\nalso be aware of it.\n\nSeemingly a more elegant solution would be to swap bt_sock_alloc() and\nl2cap_chan_create() calls since they are not interdependent to that moment\nbut then l2cap_chan_create() adds the soon to be deallocated and still\ndummy-initialized channel to the global list accessible by many L2CAP\npaths. The channel would be removed from the list in short period of time\nbut be a bit more straight-forward here and just check for NULL instead of\nchanging the order of function calls.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE static\nanalysis tool.",
"id": "GHSA-mqqf-qf5c-jg26",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:34:33Z",
"published": "2025-02-27T03:34:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58009"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-265688.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/245d48c1ba3e7a1779c2f4cbc6f581ddc8a78e22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/297ce7f544aa675b0d136d788cad0710cdfb0785"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49c0d55d59662430f1829ae85b969619573d0fa1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f397409f8ee5bc82901eeaf799e1cbc4f8edcf1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/691218a50c3139f7f57ffa79fb89d932eda9571e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e605f580a97530e5a3583beea458a3fa4cbefbd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9a7672fc1a0fe18502493936ccb06413ab89ea6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf601a24120c674cd7c907ea695f92617af6abd0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/03/msg00028.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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