GHSA-MQ8P-H4GV-VQ5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seg6: ensure packet data is writable before modifying SRH and IPv6 DA
advance_nextseg() modifies the SRH Segments Left field and the IPv6 destination address without ensuring the packet data is writable. seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() has the same problem when it advances the NEXT-C-SID argument in the destination address.
The skb may be cloned, for example by an AF_PACKET socket receiving on the ingress device. advance_nextseg() and seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() then write into the packet data shared with the clone. A read from that socket can return the modified packet instead of the received one. The simplified path below shows this for advance_nextseg():
__netif_receive_skb_one_core __netif_receive_skb_core deliver_skb [orig: users=2, cloned=0] packet_rcv skb_clone clone queued to the AF_PACKET socket consume_skb(orig) [orig: users=1, cloned=1] ipv6_rcv ip6_rcv_core skb_share_check: no-op [orig: users=1] [...] input_action_end_core advance_nextseg writes into the data shared with the clone
Call skb_ensure_writable() in advance_nextseg() and in seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() before they modify the packet data. skb_ensure_writable() may reallocate skb->head, which invalidates the pointers into the packet data taken before the call. advance_nextseg() now returns a valid SRH pointer, or NULL if skb_ensure_writable() fails. seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() takes the pointer to the destination address from the skb after skb_ensure_writable(). On failure, the callers drop the packet with SKB_DROP_REASON_NOMEM.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98802"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:34Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nseg6: ensure packet data is writable before modifying SRH and IPv6 DA\n\nadvance_nextseg() modifies the SRH Segments Left field and the IPv6\ndestination address without ensuring the packet data is writable.\nseg6_next_csid_advance_arg() has the same problem when it advances the\nNEXT-C-SID argument in the destination address.\n\nThe skb may be cloned, for example by an AF_PACKET socket receiving on\nthe ingress device. advance_nextseg() and seg6_next_csid_advance_arg()\nthen write into the packet data shared with the clone. A read from that\nsocket can return the modified packet instead of the received one. The\nsimplified path below shows this for advance_nextseg():\n\n__netif_receive_skb_one_core\n __netif_receive_skb_core\n deliver_skb [orig: users=2, cloned=0]\n packet_rcv\n skb_clone clone queued to the AF_PACKET socket\n consume_skb(orig) [orig: users=1, cloned=1]\n ipv6_rcv\n ip6_rcv_core skb_share_check: no-op [orig: users=1]\n [...]\n input_action_end_core\n advance_nextseg writes into the data shared with the clone\n\nCall skb_ensure_writable() in advance_nextseg() and in\nseg6_next_csid_advance_arg() before they modify the packet data.\nskb_ensure_writable() may reallocate skb-\u003ehead, which invalidates the\npointers into the packet data taken before the call.\nadvance_nextseg() now returns a valid SRH pointer, or NULL if\nskb_ensure_writable() fails.\nseg6_next_csid_advance_arg() takes the pointer to the destination\naddress from the skb after skb_ensure_writable().\nOn failure, the callers drop the packet with SKB_DROP_REASON_NOMEM.",
"id": "GHSA-mq8p-h4gv-vq5x",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:32:04Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98802"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ae3f4067ba4ae3a15581392f6dac422e3d3def0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9141fdb7a2ead48cfcd60c681aba91d3014255b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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