GHSA-MPR4-2MM3-RWM6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-28 12:30 – Updated: 2026-05-28 12:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

exit: prevent preemption of oopsing TASK_DEAD task

When an already-exiting task oopses, make_task_dead() currently calls do_task_dead() with preemption enabled. That is forbidden: do_task_dead() calls __schedule(), which has a comment saying "WARNING: must be called with preemption disabled!".

If an oopsing task is preempted in do_task_dead(), between becoming TASK_DEAD and entering the scheduler explicitly, bad things happen: finish_task_switch() assumes that once the scheduler has switched away from a TASK_DEAD task, the task can never run again and its stack is no longer needed; but that assumption apparently doesn't hold if the dead task was preempted (the SM_PREEMPT case).

This means that the scheduler ends up repeatedly dropping references on the dead task's stack, which can lead to use-after-free or double-free of the entire task stack; in other words, two tasks can end up running on the same stack, resulting in various kinds of memory corruption.

(This does not just affect "recursively oopsing" tasks; it is enough to oops once during task exit, for example in a file_operations::release handler)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46173"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-28T10:16:32Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nexit: prevent preemption of oopsing TASK_DEAD task\n\nWhen an already-exiting task oopses, make_task_dead() currently calls\ndo_task_dead() with preemption enabled.  That is forbidden:\ndo_task_dead() calls __schedule(), which has a comment saying \"WARNING:\nmust be called with preemption disabled!\".\n\nIf an oopsing task is preempted in do_task_dead(), between becoming\nTASK_DEAD and entering the scheduler explicitly, bad things happen:\nfinish_task_switch() assumes that once the scheduler has switched away\nfrom a TASK_DEAD task, the task can never run again and its stack is no\nlonger needed; but that assumption apparently doesn\u0027t hold if the dead\ntask was preempted (the SM_PREEMPT case).\n\nThis means that the scheduler ends up repeatedly dropping references on\nthe dead task\u0027s stack, which can lead to use-after-free or double-free\nof the entire task stack; in other words, two tasks can end up running\non the same stack, resulting in various kinds of memory corruption.\n\n(This does not just affect \"recursively oopsing\" tasks; it is enough to\noops once during task exit, for example in a file_operations::release\nhandler)",
  "id": "GHSA-mpr4-2mm3-rwm6",
  "modified": "2026-05-28T12:30:31Z",
  "published": "2026-05-28T12:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46173"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/640b4c00fb0e2920327435f6176cbefc3c546165"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f49f94f3b11fe8bff1bf2a054143789e76aaf17"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b2800ba5f5f77a8ee7f4cbadb19cf1264597a34"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9756b3db5db6c2f5eccb32dddbd88eb4c54f575e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1fa0bb633e4a6b11e83ffc57fa5abe8ebb87891"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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