GHSA-MP45-VJM2-GVHG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipvs: fix the checksum validations

ip_vs_in_icmp_v6() is missing checksum validation for ICMPv6 packets from clients. In fact, as for TCP/UDP we should validate the checksum for ICMP packets only when we mangle the packets on MASQ or on reply for tunnel.

Also, Sashiko points out that handle_response_icmp() being common for IPv4 and IPv6 is missing the pseudo-header calculation while validating ICMPv6 messages from real servers which is a problem if checksum is not validated by the hardware.

Fix the problems by creating ip_vs_checksum_common_check() helper and use it for TCP/UDP/ICMP both for IPv4 and IPv6. Rely on the nf_checksum() for validating the ICMP messages but use it also for TCP and UDP.

Use correct IP offset for IP_VS_DBG_RL_PKT for TCP/UDP/SCTP.

IPVS packets (TCP/UDP/SCTP/ICMP) do not need checksum validation on LOCAL_OUT (local clients or local real servers) and on FORWARD (traffic from servers on LAN). Do it only on LOCAL_IN, in case nf_checksum() is not called on PRE_ROUTING.

Also, ip_vs_checksum_complete() can be marked static.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-80901"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T18:17:58Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvs: fix the checksum validations\n\nip_vs_in_icmp_v6() is missing checksum validation for ICMPv6\npackets from clients. In fact, as for TCP/UDP we should\nvalidate the checksum for ICMP packets only when we\nmangle the packets on MASQ or on reply for tunnel.\n\nAlso, Sashiko points out that handle_response_icmp() being\ncommon for IPv4 and IPv6 is missing the pseudo-header\ncalculation while validating ICMPv6 messages from real\nservers which is a problem if checksum is not validated\nby the hardware.\n\nFix the problems by creating ip_vs_checksum_common_check()\nhelper and use it for TCP/UDP/ICMP both for IPv4 and IPv6.\nRely on the nf_checksum() for validating the ICMP messages\nbut use it also for TCP and UDP.\n\nUse correct IP offset for IP_VS_DBG_RL_PKT for TCP/UDP/SCTP.\n\nIPVS packets (TCP/UDP/SCTP/ICMP) do not need checksum\nvalidation on LOCAL_OUT (local clients or local real\nservers) and on FORWARD (traffic from servers on LAN).\nDo it only on LOCAL_IN, in case nf_checksum() is not\ncalled on PRE_ROUTING.\n\nAlso, ip_vs_checksum_complete() can be marked static.",
  "id": "GHSA-mp45-vjm2-gvhg",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T18:31:34Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T18:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80901"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00eb23829fd08df1b5e057cb6b625996a70e7e65"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5558a85add073215b298f3e044ff9a6d86d714ae"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cbe2c0fdb71904ee929b1851cdc1c73341a03c0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3869d9b54e76dff64118dee4c8fd9302fcd5171"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d418d73acf8be62744dc47359dfdde8c2148845d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e876b75b9020a97bbdc79721e7fc749024891c65"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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