Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-MMRQ-WQ59-JG48

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:31

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/migrate_device: avoid out-of-bounds writes for compound folios

migrate_device_range() and migrate_device_pfns() clear the entries following a compound folio so that the PFN arrays retain their page-granular representation.

If a compound folio extends beyond the end of the caller-provided range, the loops clear all following folio entries without limiting them to the number of slots remaining in the npages-sized array, causing an out-of-bounds write.

Do not proceed with a compound folio if its page-granular representation does not fit entirely in the remaining PFN array. If this happens, drop any reference and lock acquired for the folio, clear the remaining entries, and stop collecting.

Observed with a KASAN x86 QEMU kernel using the HMM migrate_anon_huge_zero selftest. Closing /dev/hmm_dmirror0 after migrating an anonymous huge page to device memory exercises:

dmirror_fops_release() -> dmirror_device_evict_chunk() -> migrate_device_range()

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89967"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:17:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/migrate_device: avoid out-of-bounds writes for compound folios\n\nmigrate_device_range() and migrate_device_pfns() clear the entries\nfollowing a compound folio so that the PFN arrays retain their\npage-granular representation.\n\nIf a compound folio extends beyond the end of the caller-provided range,\nthe loops clear all following folio entries without limiting them to the\nnumber of slots remaining in the npages-sized array, causing an\nout-of-bounds write.\n\nDo not proceed with a compound folio if its page-granular representation\ndoes not fit entirely in the remaining PFN array.  If this happens, drop\nany reference and lock acquired for the folio, clear the remaining\nentries, and stop collecting.\n\nObserved with a KASAN x86 QEMU kernel using the HMM migrate_anon_huge_zero\nselftest.  Closing /dev/hmm_dmirror0 after migrating an anonymous huge\npage to device memory exercises:\n\n  dmirror_fops_release()\n    -\u003e dmirror_device_evict_chunk()\n      -\u003e migrate_device_range()",
  "id": "GHSA-mmrq-wq59-jg48",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T15:31:03Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T12:30:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89967"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99186b185c245f5987d7f8715d5504c8d8cc04a0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc41e961a269f2ca4196e669d6d8e05480899cd4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-89967 (GCVE-0-2026-89967)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-16 10:32 – Updated: 2026-10-19 08:55

Title

mm/migrate_device: avoid out-of-bounds writes for compound folios

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/migrate_device: avoid out-of-bounds writes for compound folios migrate_device_range() and migrate_device_pfns() clear the entries following a compound folio so that the PFN arrays retain their page-granular representation. If a compound folio extends beyond the end of the caller-provided range, the loops clear all following folio entries without limiting them to the number of slots remaining in the npages-sized array, causing an out-of-bounds write. Do not proceed with a compound folio if its page-granular representation does not fit entirely in the remaining PFN array. If this happens, drop any reference and lock acquired for the folio, clear the remaining entries, and stop collecting. Observed with a KASAN x86 QEMU kernel using the HMM migrate_anon_huge_zero selftest. Closing /dev/hmm_dmirror0 after migrating an anonymous huge page to device memory exercises: dmirror_fops_release() -> dmirror_device_evict_chunk() -> migrate_device_range()

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 6639 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99186b185c245f598…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc41e961a269f2ca4…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: a30b48bf1b244f11bf9b6d20cdccfe0c2264130c , < 99186b185c245f5987d7f8715d5504c8d8cc04a0 (git) Affected: a30b48bf1b244f11bf9b6d20cdccfe0c2264130c , < dc41e961a269f2ca4196e669d6d8e05480899cd4 (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 6.19 Unaffected: 0 , < 6.19 (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.5 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/migrate_device.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "99186b185c245f5987d7f8715d5504c8d8cc04a0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "a30b48bf1b244f11bf9b6d20cdccfe0c2264130c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "dc41e961a269f2ca4196e669d6d8e05480899cd4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "a30b48bf1b244f11bf9b6d20cdccfe0c2264130c",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/migrate_device.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.19"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.19",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.5",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/migrate_device: avoid out-of-bounds writes for compound folios\n\nmigrate_device_range() and migrate_device_pfns() clear the entries\nfollowing a compound folio so that the PFN arrays retain their\npage-granular representation.\n\nIf a compound folio extends beyond the end of the caller-provided range,\nthe loops clear all following folio entries without limiting them to the\nnumber of slots remaining in the npages-sized array, causing an\nout-of-bounds write.\n\nDo not proceed with a compound folio if its page-granular representation\ndoes not fit entirely in the remaining PFN array.  If this happens, drop\nany reference and lock acquired for the folio, clear the remaining\nentries, and stop collecting.\n\nObserved with a KASAN x86 QEMU kernel using the HMM migrate_anon_huge_zero\nselftest.  Closing /dev/hmm_dmirror0 after migrating an anonymous huge\npage to device memory exercises:\n\n  dmirror_fops_release()\n    -\u003e dmirror_device_evict_chunk()\n      -\u003e migrate_device_range()"
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The OOB write is in migrate_device_range()/migrate_device_pfns() on the device-private eviction path, reached from local HMM/GPU SVM (close of /dev/hmm_dmirror*, Nouveau dmem teardown, Intel Xe drm_pagemap_evict_to_ram after DRM_XE_VM_BIND), not from received network packets.\nAC:L - The attacker creates a compound device folio by migrating an anonymous THP or huge-zero page, then triggers eviction of a too-small PFN array (dmirror close/HMM_DMIRROR_RELEASE or Xe TTM eviction of a CPU_ADDR_MIRROR BO). The HMM selftest hits this deterministically; no victim timing is required.\nPR:L - Intel Xe DRM_XE_VM_BIND is DRM_RENDER_ALLOW with no capable() or DRM-master check. An unprivileged local user with typical render/video-group access to /dev/dri/renderD* can migrate a THP to device memory and force drm_pagemap_evict_to_ram.\nUI:N - The attacker performs mmap/madvise, the migrate ioctl, and eviction or close entirely in their own process. No other user or administrator needs to mount a filesystem, open a file, or otherwise interact.\nS:U - The overflow corrupts host-kernel memory adjacent to the caller-provided src_pfns kvcalloc/kvmalloc array. That is standard local privilege escalation in the same security authority, not a KVM/Xen guest-to-host escape or IOMMU/DMA bypass.\nC:H - migrate_device_* zeros every tail slot of a compound folio without clipping to npages, overflowing the PFN array by up to (folio_nr_pages-remaining) pointers (~4KB for a 2MB THP). That heap corruption can be turned into an arbitrary kernel read via overlapping objects.\nI:H - The same unbounded store is an out-of-bounds kernel write into adjacent slab/vmalloc objects. Zeroing neighboring heap metadata, pointers, or function pointers is exploitable for an arbitrary write and control-flow hijack, not a bounded integrity change.\nA:H - KASAN reports this overflow on the HMM migrate_anon_huge_zero selftest when closing /dev/hmm_dmirror0, and smashing adjacent kernel objects with zeros causes an oops or panic even without a completed exploit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:55:40.822Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99186b185c245f5987d7f8715d5504c8d8cc04a0"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc41e961a269f2ca4196e669d6d8e05480899cd4"
        }
      ],
      "title": "mm/migrate_device: avoid out-of-bounds writes for compound folios",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-89967",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-16T10:32:48.164Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.778Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:55:40.822Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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