GHSA-MJ73-X9XH-684V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-16 15:30 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:40In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix gpu page fault after hibernation on PF passthrough
On PF passthrough environment, after hibernate and then resume, coralgemm will cause gpu page fault.
Mode1 reset happens during hibernate, but partition mode is not restored on resume, register mmCP_HYP_XCP_CTL and mmCP_PSP_XCP_CTL is not right after resume. When CP access the MQD BO, wrong stride size is used, this will cause out of bound access on the MQD BO, resulting page fault.
The fix is to ensure gfx_v9_4_3_switch_compute_partition() is called when resume from a hibernation. KFD resume is called separately during a reset recovery or resume from suspend sequence. Hence it's not required to be called as part of partition switch.
(cherry picked from commit 5d1b32cfe4a676fe552416cb5ae847b215463a1a)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68230"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-16T14:15:57Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdgpu: fix gpu page fault after hibernation on PF passthrough\n\nOn PF passthrough environment, after hibernate and then resume, coralgemm\nwill cause gpu page fault.\n\nMode1 reset happens during hibernate, but partition mode is not restored\non resume, register mmCP_HYP_XCP_CTL and mmCP_PSP_XCP_CTL is not right\nafter resume. When CP access the MQD BO, wrong stride size is used,\nthis will cause out of bound access on the MQD BO, resulting page fault.\n\nThe fix is to ensure gfx_v9_4_3_switch_compute_partition() is called\nwhen resume from a hibernation.\nKFD resume is called separately during a reset recovery or resume from\nsuspend sequence. Hence it\u0027s not required to be called as part of\npartition switch.\n\n(cherry picked from commit 5d1b32cfe4a676fe552416cb5ae847b215463a1a)",
"id": "GHSA-mj73-x9xh-684v",
"modified": "2026-10-21T15:40:12Z",
"published": "2025-12-16T15:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68230"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a45d6359eefb41e08d374a3260b10bff5626823b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb6e7f520d6efa4d4ebf1671455abe4a681f7a05"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eef72d856f978955e633c270abb1f7ec7b61c6d2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0ee42f47cc1b0a95d2d22ba352ff89fc0cd13d4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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