GHSA-MHX6-CQ85-VMGG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-28 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_flower: validate mask pointer after nla_next()
fl_set_enc_opt() iterates the key's nested tunnel-option attributes with nla_for_each_attr() while advancing a single mask pointer via nla_next() at the bottom of each loop, so the mask cursor is driven by the number of key attributes rather than by the mask's own attributes. The nla_ok() added by commit c96adff956191 ("cls_flower: call nla_ok() before nla_next()") only validates the mask pointer that was just consumed; the pointer produced by nla_next() is used by the next iteration (fl_set_geneve_opt() and siblings) without any validation.
The mask's nested attributes are validated with NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL, which merely warns on trailing bytes that do not form a complete attribute. A mask carrying one valid attribute plus 1-3 residue bytes (or a non-aligned attribute length making msk_depth negative) therefore reaches the next iteration with msk_depth != 0, so neither the !msk_depth check in fl_set_enc_opt() nor the !depth check in the per-type helpers fires. nla_type() then reads past the mask payload and nla_parse_nested_deprecated() iterates with an nla_len taken from those bytes, reading well beyond the mask attribute (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds read in __nla_validate_parse from fl_change()).
Validate the advanced mask pointer as well: when the mask is not legitimately exhausted (msk_depth != 0) and the new pointer fails nla_ok(), reject the filter with -EINVAL. An exactly exhausted mask still skips the check, preserving exact-match behaviour for the remaining key attributes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99112"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T11:17:30Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: cls_flower: validate mask pointer after nla_next()\n\nfl_set_enc_opt() iterates the key\u0027s nested tunnel-option attributes\nwith nla_for_each_attr() while advancing a single mask pointer via\nnla_next() at the bottom of each loop, so the mask cursor is driven\nby the number of key attributes rather than by the mask\u0027s own\nattributes. The nla_ok() added by commit c96adff956191 (\"cls_flower:\ncall nla_ok() before nla_next()\") only validates the mask pointer\nthat was just consumed; the pointer produced by nla_next() is used by\nthe next iteration (fl_set_geneve_opt() and siblings) without any\nvalidation.\n\nThe mask\u0027s nested attributes are validated with NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL,\nwhich merely warns on trailing bytes that do not form a complete\nattribute. A mask carrying one valid attribute plus 1-3 residue\nbytes (or a non-aligned attribute length making msk_depth negative)\ntherefore reaches the next iteration with msk_depth != 0, so neither\nthe !msk_depth check in fl_set_enc_opt() nor the !depth check in the\nper-type helpers fires. nla_type() then reads past the mask payload\nand nla_parse_nested_deprecated() iterates with an nla_len taken\nfrom those bytes, reading well beyond the mask attribute (KASAN:\nslab-out-of-bounds read in __nla_validate_parse from fl_change()).\n\nValidate the advanced mask pointer as well: when the mask is not\nlegitimately exhausted (msk_depth != 0) and the new pointer fails\nnla_ok(), reject the filter with -EINVAL. An exactly exhausted mask\nstill skips the check, preserving exact-match behaviour for the\nremaining key attributes.",
"id": "GHSA-mhx6-cq85-vmgg",
"modified": "2026-10-28T12:31:02Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T12:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45e60747a9db2307929260d9aa9c1c6cbb70ee77"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb187146c7e5c666874784e4f3fc1bc5126e6e92"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fee10655709c5c597e8e9f722f3035d9ea31ff3a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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