GHSA-MHQ8-78PJ-5J79
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 16:05 – Updated: 2026-08-25 16:38Summary
On POSIX nodes, OpenClaw's system.run safe-bin checks could approve a command before shell expansion changed how the command was interpreted. A value that appeared to be a safe-bin argument could expand into additional shell words and become a file operand.
This issue is limited to paired POSIX node execution through system.run with safe-bin or allowlist-style auto-approval. It is not an unauthenticated node takeover.
Affected configurations
This affects deployments where:
- a POSIX node is paired to the gateway
system.runis reachable by an authenticated operator or agent flow- exec policy uses safe-bin or allowlist-based auto-approval
- the approved command contains shell-expanded values that can change argv shape
Impact
A lower-privilege operator flow could cause an approved safe-bin command to read a node-local file that was not intended by the policy. Depending on the local files available to the node process, this could expose OpenClaw configuration data or other node-local information.
The issue is a policy-enforcement gap in argv validation, not a general statement that every safe-bin command is unsafe.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.18.
Mitigations
Upgrade to openclaw@2026.5.18 or later. Before upgrading, avoid broad safe-bin auto-approval for commands that can read arbitrary paths, and prefer explicit approval for node commands that touch local files.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.5.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53831"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-284",
"CWE-367",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T16:05:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOn POSIX nodes, OpenClaw\u0027s `system.run` safe-bin checks could approve a command before shell expansion changed how the command was interpreted. A value that appeared to be a safe-bin argument could expand into additional shell words and become a file operand.\n\nThis issue is limited to paired POSIX node execution through `system.run` with safe-bin or allowlist-style auto-approval. It is not an unauthenticated node takeover.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nThis affects deployments where:\n\n- a POSIX node is paired to the gateway\n- `system.run` is reachable by an authenticated operator or agent flow\n- exec policy uses safe-bin or allowlist-based auto-approval\n- the approved command contains shell-expanded values that can change argv shape\n\n### Impact\n\nA lower-privilege operator flow could cause an approved safe-bin command to read a node-local file that was not intended by the policy. Depending on the local files available to the node process, this could expose OpenClaw configuration data or other node-local information.\n\nThe issue is a policy-enforcement gap in argv validation, not a general statement that every safe-bin command is unsafe.\n\n### Patched Versions\n\nThe first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nUpgrade to `openclaw@2026.5.18` or later. Before upgrading, avoid broad safe-bin auto-approval for commands that can read arbitrary paths, and prefer explicit approval for node commands that touch local files.",
"id": "GHSA-mhq8-78pj-5j79",
"modified": "2026-08-25T16:38:50Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T16:05:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-mhq8-78pj-5j79"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53831"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-file-read-via-shell-expansion-in-system-run-safe-bin-allowlist"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s POSIX node system.run safe-bin allowlist could be widened by shell expansion"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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