GHSA-MH3C-9RPG-GXV8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-24 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gud: validate TV mode names before creating enum property
The GUD protocol returns TV mode names as fixed-size GUD_CONNECTOR_TV_MODE_NAME_LEN entries and requires each name to be NUL-terminated.
gud_connector_add_tv_mode() currently passes each fixed-size entry directly to drm_mode_create_tv_properties_legacy(), which eventually reaches drm_property_add_enum() and strlen(). If a device returns an entry without a terminating NUL byte, strlen() reads past the end of the slot and can run beyond the allocated buffer, triggering an out-of-bounds read.
Validate that each returned TV mode name contains a NUL terminator within its fixed-size slot before passing it to the DRM property code. If a malformed entry is found, reject the device response with -EIO.
This fixes the out-of-bounds read without changing the handling of valid devices, and avoids silently truncating malformed protocol data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93234"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T16:17:19Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/gud: validate TV mode names before creating enum property\n\nThe GUD protocol returns TV mode names as fixed-size\nGUD_CONNECTOR_TV_MODE_NAME_LEN entries and requires each name to be\nNUL-terminated.\n\ngud_connector_add_tv_mode() currently passes each fixed-size entry\ndirectly to drm_mode_create_tv_properties_legacy(), which eventually\nreaches drm_property_add_enum() and strlen(). If a device returns an\nentry without a terminating NUL byte, strlen() reads past the end of\nthe slot and can run beyond the allocated buffer, triggering an\nout-of-bounds read.\n\nValidate that each returned TV mode name contains a NUL terminator\nwithin its fixed-size slot before passing it to the DRM property code.\nIf a malformed entry is found, reject the device response with -EIO.\n\nThis fixes the out-of-bounds read without changing the handling of\nvalid devices, and avoids silently truncating malformed protocol data.",
"id": "GHSA-mh3c-9rpg-gxv8",
"modified": "2026-09-24T18:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T18:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93234"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/06fcaf21c18ac88f57fee3803554f48c6026b95f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/082e378886547b5b1c4075ed307f7c68547868dc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/676f1fb3632bbc9ce83be7938e93fe6bfc9510fd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70cffc31a380b3eae45027101647aa94c242aa0e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72a95df6bbc7d20c7af1e39d86b3e910cccd01ad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da1ea35fea67ad841f4ada28dd61b41be65e5437"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eab46d9629807db1b5647d17227e16110a18227f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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