{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/portainer/portainer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.33.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44882"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T16:24:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nPortainer proxies requests to Kubernetes clusters through a middleware layer (`kubeClientMiddleware`) that validates the requesting user\u0027s token before forwarding traffic to the cluster. When `security.RetrieveTokenData` returned an error, the middleware wrote an HTTP 403 response but was missing a `return` statement \u2014 execution continued into the handler with a nil `tokenData` value.\n\nThe Kubernetes endpoints sit behind Portainer\u0027s outer `AuthenticatedAccess` bouncer, so an attacker requires a valid Portainer session. However, a user whose secondary token validation fails in `kubeClientMiddleware` \u2014 for example a user without permission to access a given Kubernetes endpoint \u2014 would have their request forwarded to the cluster anyway, bypassing the authorization check. The same defect was present in both the CE and EE codebases.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High**\n**CWE-863** \u2014 Incorrect Authorization\n\nPrivilege required is Low \u2014 any valid Portainer session is sufficient to reach the middleware. Once the authorization outcome is bypassed, the attacker can read and modify Kubernetes resources on the target endpoint that their role should not permit \u2014 confidentiality and integrity impact are both High. No availability impact is introduced directly.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nThe missing `return` statement has been present since Kubernetes proxy support was introduced.\n\n| Branch       | First vulnerable | Fixed in   |\n|--------------|------------------|------------|\n| 2.33.x (LTS) | 2.33.0           | **2.33.8** |\n\nPortainer 2.39.0 and later are not affected \u2014 the fix was present from the initial 2.39.0 release. All releases prior to 2.33.0 are end-of-life and will not receive a fix; users on EOL versions should upgrade to a supported release.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nThere is no configuration change that prevents the bypass directly. Administrators who cannot immediately upgrade can reduce exposure by:\n\n- **Restricting Kubernetes endpoint access.** Remove Portainer access to Kubernetes endpoints for users who do not require it. A user without endpoint access cannot reach `kubeClientMiddleware`.\n- **Auditing Kubernetes RBAC.** Ensure the service account Portainer uses to proxy cluster requests carries least-privilege RBAC permissions \u2014 this limits the blast radius if the bypass is exploited.\n\nNeither of these replaces the fix.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n`kubeClientMiddleware` in `api/http/handler/kubernetes/handler.go` wrote the error response but did not return, allowing execution to continue with nil `tokenData`:\n\n```go\n// api/http/handler/kubernetes/handler.go (pre-fix \u2014 CE and EE)\ntokenData, err := security.RetrieveTokenData(r)\nif err != nil {\n    httperror.WriteError(w, http.StatusForbidden,\n        \"permission denied to access the environment\", err)\n    // missing return \u2014 tokenData is nil, execution continues\n}\n\n// tokenData.ID dereferenced on the next line:\n_, ok := handler.KubernetesClientFactory.GetProxyKubeClient(\n    strconv.Itoa(endpointID), strconv.Itoa(int(tokenData.ID)))\n```\nThe fix adds a single return after the WriteError call in both CE and EE:\n\n```go\n// post-fix\nif err != nil {\n    httperror.WriteError(w, http.StatusForbidden,\n        \"permission denied to access the environment\", err)\n    return\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n- Kubernetes authorization bypass. A low-privileged Portainer user can reach Kubernetes API endpoints on environments their role does not permit, with the proxy client of the legitimate session used as the vehicle.\n- Cluster resource access. Depending on the service account permissions Portainer holds on the cluster, the attacker can read or modify namespaced resources \u2014 including pods, secrets, config maps, and deployments.\n- Potential for lateral movement. Kubernetes secrets readable through this path may contain credentials for other services within the cluster or the broader infrastructure.\n\n## Timeline\n- 2026-02-16: Fix merged to develop.\n- 2026-02-25: 2.39.0 released with fix.\n- 2026-05-07: 2.33.8 released with backport fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-mgq6-4x29-88r3",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T16:24:29Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T16:24:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer/security/advisories/GHSA-mgq6-4x29-88r3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer/releases/tag/2.33.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Portainer\u0027s Kubernetes middleware continues after token validation failure, bypassing endpoint authorization"
}