GHSA-MF77-WWF7-M2FF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (lm90) Add lock protection to lm90_alert
Sashiko reports:
lm90_alert() executes in the smbus alert context and calls lm90_update_confreg() to disable the hardware alert line, without acquiring hwmon_lock.
Concurrently, sysfs write operations (such as lm90_write_convrate) hold the hwmon_lock, temporarily modify data->config, and then restore it.
If an alert interrupt occurs concurrently with a sysfs write, the sysfs path will overwrite the alert handler's modifications to data->config and the hardware register.
This unintentionally re-enables the hardware alert line while the alarm is still active, causing an interrupt storm.
Add the missing lock to lm90_alert() to solve the problem.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64213"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-24T16:16:48Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwmon: (lm90) Add lock protection to lm90_alert\n\nSashiko reports:\n\nlm90_alert() executes in the smbus alert context and calls\nlm90_update_confreg() to disable the hardware alert line, without\nacquiring hwmon_lock.\n\nConcurrently, sysfs write operations (such as lm90_write_convrate) hold\nthe hwmon_lock, temporarily modify data-\u003econfig, and then restore it.\n\nIf an alert interrupt occurs concurrently with a sysfs write, the sysfs\npath will overwrite the alert handler\u0027s modifications to data-\u003econfig\nand the hardware register.\n\nThis unintentionally re-enables the hardware alert line while the alarm is\nstill active, causing an interrupt storm.\n\nAdd the missing lock to lm90_alert() to solve the problem.",
"id": "GHSA-mf77-wwf7-m2ff",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:55Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T18:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64213"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02b88fa993582b4fe228b4143b330b0bb9f28353"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/165ef777ec6f634a5e4b8d9b0dadca8ef91fa90e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1dc6a3469b5427e3bfd19010d7755ebc6019abc1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/873e919e3101063a7a75989510ccfc125a4391cf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0b66aae8a94c3663d47e4000b0e81b89ce32186"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bed1fc32e0eb653806fa98afcf55f9a311fc4ce2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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