GHSA-MCQQ-386F-GVF4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs/ntfs3: fix missing run load for vcn0 in attr_data_get_block_locked()

When a compressed or sparse attribute has its clusters frame-aligned, vcn is rounded down to the frame start using cmask, which can result in vcn != vcn0. In this case, vcn and vcn0 may reside in different attribute segments.

The code already handles the case where vcn is in a different segment by loading its runs before allocation. However, it fails to load runs for vcn0 when vcn0 resides in a different segment than vcn. This causes run_lookup_entry() to return SPARSE_LCN for vcn0 since its segment was never loaded into the in-memory run list, triggering the WARN_ON(1).

Fix this by adding a missing check for vcn0 after the existing vcn segment check. If vcn0 falls outside the current segment range [svcn, evcn1), find and load the attribute segment containing vcn0 before performing the run lookup.

The following scenario triggers the bug: attr_data_get_block_locked() vcn = vcn0 & cmask <- vcn != vcn0 after frame alignment load runs for vcn segment <- vcn0 segment not loaded! attr_allocate_clusters() <- allocation succeeds run_lookup_entry(vcn0) <- vcn0 not in run -> SPARSE_LCN WARN_ON(1) <- bug fires here!

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53027"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs/ntfs3: fix missing run load for vcn0 in attr_data_get_block_locked()\n\nWhen a compressed or sparse attribute has its clusters frame-aligned,\nvcn is rounded down to the frame start using cmask, which can result\nin vcn != vcn0. In this case, vcn and vcn0 may reside in different\nattribute segments.\n\nThe code already handles the case where vcn is in a different segment\nby loading its runs before allocation. However, it fails to load runs\nfor vcn0 when vcn0 resides in a different segment than vcn. This causes\nrun_lookup_entry() to return SPARSE_LCN for vcn0 since its segment was\nnever loaded into the in-memory run list, triggering the WARN_ON(1).\n\nFix this by adding a missing check for vcn0 after the existing vcn\nsegment check. If vcn0 falls outside the current segment range\n[svcn, evcn1), find and load the attribute segment containing vcn0\nbefore performing the run lookup.\n\nThe following scenario triggers the bug:\n  attr_data_get_block_locked()\n    vcn = vcn0 \u0026 cmask        \u003c- vcn != vcn0 after frame alignment\n    load runs for vcn segment \u003c- vcn0 segment not loaded!\n    attr_allocate_clusters()  \u003c- allocation succeeds\n    run_lookup_entry(vcn0)    \u003c- vcn0 not in run -\u003e SPARSE_LCN\n    WARN_ON(1)                \u003c- bug fires here!",
  "id": "GHSA-mcqq-386f-gvf4",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:42Z",
  "published": "2026-06-24T18:32:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53027"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08fad5d5a26cc55c0ecb68ac59ba3be5e31f4147"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b4ae1ce613ade8a7e118fba4a5a77cd23e97e54"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/543093f65318d012850e548b241f85381b14d643"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d68a14450783ecc5fddae957ac4e1c546dfcfb73"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7ea8495fd307b58f8867acd81a1b40075b1d3ba"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea59d9dbc5504e29d420ac4aab774cbce39b0e69"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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