{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "aegra-api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44504"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T01:49:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T16:16:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nAegra deployments running 0.9.0 through 0.9.6 with multiple authenticated users on a shared instance are vulnerable to a cross-tenant IDOR. Any authenticated user (User A), given another user\u0027s `thread_id` (User B), can:\n\n- Execute graph runs against User B\u0027s thread via `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs`, `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs/stream`, or `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs/wait`\n- Read User B\u0027s full checkpoint state via the resulting run\u0027s `output` field\n- Inject arbitrary messages into User B\u0027s conversation history (persisted in B\u0027s checkpoint)\n- Hide their activity from User B\u0027s `GET /threads/{thread_id}/runs` listing because the run carries A\u0027s `user_id`\n\nThe streaming variant is worse \u2014 the first SSE `event: values` frame returns the entire prior `messages` array immediately on connection, no graph execution needed.\n\nThread IDs are UUIDs but leak through frontend URLs, server logs, observability traces, and shared links. Guessing is not required.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in **0.9.7**. The three affected endpoints now perform an SQL-level `user_id == authenticated_user.identity` check before calling `_prepare_run`. When the thread exists but is owned by another user, the response is `404 Thread not found` (matching the read-side pattern) to avoid leaking thread existence.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrade is not immediately possible, register an `@auth.on(\"threads\", \"create_run\")` handler that explicitly verifies thread ownership against the authenticated identity before allowing the operation. Without a handler, no built-in authorization runs on these write paths.\n\nExample mitigation handler:\n\n```python\nfrom langgraph_sdk import Auth\n\nauth = Auth()\n\n@auth.on(\"threads\", \"create_run\")\nasync def enforce_thread_owner(ctx: Auth.types.AuthContext, value: dict):\n    # Look up the thread, raise 404 if not owned by ctx.user.identity.\n    # Implementation depends on your data layer.\n    ...\n```\n\n## Root cause\n\nAegra\u0027s authorization model delegates per-resource policy to user-defined `@auth.on` handlers. When no handler is registered, `handle_event(...)` returns `None` and the request proceeds (default-allow). Read endpoints in `api/threads.py` add a defense-in-depth `user_id` filter at the SQL layer, but the run-creation endpoints in `api/runs.py` skipped that filter. Result: out-of-the-box deployments without custom auth handlers were vulnerable.\n\n## Affected endpoints\n\n- `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs`\n- `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs/stream`\n- `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs/wait`\n\nStateless variants (`POST /runs`, `POST /runs/wait`, `POST /runs/stream`) are NOT affected \u2014 they generate a fresh `thread_id` server-side and never accept a caller-supplied one.\n\n## Credits\n\n- @JoJoTheBizarre \u2014 discovered and reported the vulnerability with a precise reproducer (#336)\n- @victorjmarin and @jawhardjebbi \u2014 wrote the fix and added test coverage at unit, integration, and manual-auth e2e levels (#337)\n\n## Resources\n\n- Issue: https://github.com/aegra/aegra/issues/336\n- Fix PR: https://github.com/aegra/aegra/pull/337\n- Release: https://github.com/aegra/aegra/releases/tag/v0.9.7",
  "id": "GHSA-m98r-6667-4wq7",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:53:21Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T01:49:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aegra/aegra/security/advisories/GHSA-m98r-6667-4wq7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44504"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aegra/aegra/issues/336"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aegra/aegra/pull/337"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aegra/aegra/commit/e1b2042254fd49072ca281bc35b3f2a3bed74b31"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/aegra/aegra"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aegra/aegra/releases/tag/v0.9.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Aegra has cross-user run injection in /threads/{thread_id}/runs (IDOR)"
}