GHSA-M8PM-862W-46PW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name()
Since commit 541c8f2468b9 ("dma-buf: detach fence ops on signal v3"), I'm seeing the BUG_ON() triggering in drm_crtc's fence_to_crtc() via drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() regularly:
Call trace:
panic+0x58/0x5c
die+0x160/0x178
bug_brk_handler+0x70/0xa4
call_el1_break_hook+0x3c/0x1a0
do_el1_brk64+0x24/0x74
el1_brk64+0x34/0x54
el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xfc
el1h_64_sync+0x84/0x88
drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name+0x60/0x68 (P)
sync_file_get_name+0x184/0x45c
sync_file_ioctl+0x404/0xf70
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x1dc
This looks to be caused by a code flow similar to the following:
+++ snip +++ thread A thread B
ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO)
sync_file_ioctl()
sync_file_get_name()
dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked() dma_fence_driver_name() ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops) if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag()) ops->get_driver_name(fence) i.e. drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() test_and_set_bit(SIGNALED) RCU_INIT_POINTER(fence->ops, NULL) drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() BUG_ON(rcu_access_pointer(fence->ops) != &drm_crtc_fence_ops) +++ snap +++
In other words, a fence's ops pointer can now change to NULL on signal, which wasn't the case before the culprit commit and hence the BUG_ON() triggers.
Simply drop the BUG_ON() as it's usage of fence ops is invalid now, and because using BUG_ON() and friends to take down the system is an unacceptable way to handle a failure.
Note that the adjacent drm_crtc_fence_get_timeline_name() has the same problem and is fixed by this patch as well.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99772"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:15Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name()\n\nSince commit 541c8f2468b9 (\"dma-buf: detach fence ops on signal v3\"),\nI\u0027m seeing the BUG_ON() triggering in drm_crtc\u0027s fence_to_crtc() via\ndrm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() regularly:\n\n Call trace:\n panic+0x58/0x5c\n die+0x160/0x178\n bug_brk_handler+0x70/0xa4\n call_el1_break_hook+0x3c/0x1a0\n do_el1_brk64+0x24/0x74\n el1_brk64+0x34/0x54\n el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xfc\n el1h_64_sync+0x84/0x88\n drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name+0x60/0x68 (P)\n sync_file_get_name+0x184/0x45c\n sync_file_ioctl+0x404/0xf70\n __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x1dc\n\nThis looks to be caused by a code flow similar to the following:\n\n+++ snip +++\nthread A thread B\n\n ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO)\n sync_file_ioctl()\n sync_file_get_name()\ndma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked() dma_fence_driver_name()\n ops = rcu_dereference(fence-\u003eops)\n if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag())\n ops-\u003eget_driver_name(fence) i.e.\n drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()\ntest_and_set_bit(SIGNALED)\nRCU_INIT_POINTER(fence-\u003eops, NULL)\n drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()\n BUG_ON(rcu_access_pointer(fence-\u003eops)\n != \u0026drm_crtc_fence_ops)\n+++ snap +++\n\nIn other words, a fence\u0027s ops pointer can now change to NULL on signal,\nwhich wasn\u0027t the case before the culprit commit and hence the BUG_ON()\ntriggers.\n\nSimply drop the BUG_ON() as it\u0027s usage of fence ops is invalid now, and\nbecause using BUG_ON() and friends to take down the system is an\nunacceptable way to handle a failure.\n\nNote that the adjacent drm_crtc_fence_get_timeline_name() has the same\nproblem and is fixed by this patch as well.",
"id": "GHSA-m8pm-862w-46pw",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99772"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84b31b9b294ac2f41fc7720444b9171e62562e6f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb104d395da48d965665fefe8502f71b6e7e3733"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.