GHSA-M843-78WR-M386
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: do not repeat ceph_trim_dentries() if no progress possible
ceph_cap_reclaim_work() re-queues itself for as long as
ceph_trim_dentries() returns -EAGAIN, which happens whenever a lease
walk exhausts its nr_to_scan budget. This creates a busy loop that
consumes CPU without making any progress when there is nothing to
reclaim: with no cap pressure (count==0) and every scanned lease
still valid, each pass runs the full scan budget down to zero and
returns -EAGAIN, only to be queued again immediately.
The dir-lease walk made this worse. When expire_dir_lease is
false (i.e. we have no intention of reclaiming dir leases),
__dir_lease_check() returned TOUCH for every valid lease. TOUCH
moves the dentry to the tail of the list and resets di->time via
__dentry_dir_lease_touch(), so a walk over N valid leases pointlessly
rewrote the list, refreshed the timestamps (preventing them from ever
aging out) and always drained nr_to_scan, guaranteeing the -EAGAIN
requeue.
Fix this in three steps:
-
Return
KEEPinstead ofTOUCHwhenexpire_dir_leaseisfalse. If we are not going to reclaim the lease, leave it in place instead of churning the list and resetting its timestamp; the walk then terminates naturally (or viaSTOPat the first fresh lease). -
Only return
-EAGAINfrom the first (dentry-lease) walk when something was actually freed. A full batch that frees nothing means retrying the same list immediately is futile; fall through to the dir-lease walk instead. -
After both walks, bail out with success (0) when nothing was freed and there is no cap pressure (
count==0). There is no reason to keep retrying when we are not over the cap limit and made no progress.
Under real cap pressure (count>0) the reclaim path is unchanged and
still retries via -EAGAIN.
Without this patch, I saw 500 ceph_trim_dentries() calls per second on
our web servers. This is very visible in /proc/lock_stat (5 minute
capture):
class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock: 126180 128218 0.04 8063.44 15986965.20 124.69 1573354 5296812 0.04 8291.28 74164526.48 14.00
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 111736 [<000000007b11e319>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8 &mdsc->dentry_list_lock 2631 [<0000000050597999>] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8 &mdsc->dentry_list_lock 3878 [<00000000c0022f62>] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8 &mdsc->dentry_list_lock 9973 [<000000002f27cb6f>] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 123621 [<0000000050597999>] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8 &mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1822 [<000000007b11e319>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8 &mdsc->dentry_list_lock 2720 [<000000002f27cb6f>] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0 &mdsc->dentry_list_lock 55 [<00000000c0022f62>] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8
With this patch:
class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock: 1203 1215 0.16 408.88 33082.88 27.23 4320501 7357389 0.04 500.64 1961578.00 0.27
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1029 [<000000003c9aea8a>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8 &mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1 ---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89647"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: do not repeat ceph_trim_dentries() if no progress possible\n\nceph_cap_reclaim_work() re-queues itself for as long as\nceph_trim_dentries() returns -EAGAIN, which happens whenever a lease\nwalk exhausts its `nr_to_scan` budget. This creates a busy loop that\nconsumes CPU without making any progress when there is nothing to\nreclaim: with no cap pressure (`count==0`) and every scanned lease\nstill valid, each pass runs the full scan budget down to zero and\nreturns `-EAGAIN`, only to be queued again immediately.\n\nThe dir-lease walk made this worse. When `expire_dir_lease` is\n`false` (i.e. we have no intention of reclaiming dir leases),\n__dir_lease_check() returned `TOUCH` for every valid lease. `TOUCH`\nmoves the dentry to the tail of the list and resets `di-\u003etime` via\n__dentry_dir_lease_touch(), so a walk over N valid leases pointlessly\nrewrote the list, refreshed the timestamps (preventing them from ever\naging out) and always drained `nr_to_scan`, guaranteeing the `-EAGAIN`\nrequeue.\n\nFix this in three steps:\n\n - Return `KEEP` instead of `TOUCH` when `expire_dir_lease` is\n `false`. If we are not going to reclaim the lease, leave it in\n place instead of churning the list and resetting its timestamp; the\n walk then terminates naturally (or via `STOP` at the first fresh\n lease).\n\n - Only return `-EAGAIN` from the first (dentry-lease) walk when something\n was actually freed. A full batch that frees nothing means retrying\n the same list immediately is futile; fall through to the dir-lease\n walk instead.\n\n - After both walks, bail out with success (0) when nothing was freed\n and there is no cap pressure (`count==0`). There is no reason to\n keep retrying when we are not over the cap limit and made no\n progress.\n\nUnder real cap pressure (`count\u003e0`) the reclaim path is unchanged and\nstill retries via `-EAGAIN`.\n\nWithout this patch, I saw 500 ceph_trim_dentries() calls per second on\nour web servers. This is very visible in `/proc/lock_stat` (5 minute\ncapture):\n\n class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg\n\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock: 126180 128218 0.04 8063.44 15986965.20 124.69 1573354 5296812 0.04 8291.28 74164526.48 14.00\n -----------------------\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock 111736 [\u003c000000007b11e319\u003e] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock 2631 [\u003c0000000050597999\u003e] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock 3878 [\u003c00000000c0022f62\u003e] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock 9973 [\u003c000000002f27cb6f\u003e] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0\n -----------------------\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock 123621 [\u003c0000000050597999\u003e] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock 1822 [\u003c000000007b11e319\u003e] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock 2720 [\u003c000000002f27cb6f\u003e] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock 55 [\u003c00000000c0022f62\u003e] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8\n\nWith this patch:\n\n class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg\n\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock: 1203 1215 0.16 408.88 33082.88 27.23 4320501 7357389 0.04 500.64 1961578.00 0.27\n -----------------------\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock 1029 [\u003c000000003c9aea8a\u003e] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8\n \u0026mdsc-\u003edentry_list_lock 1\n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-m843-78wr-m386",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:23Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89647"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37d6edb2f03b29399a3a337fae78674de51e1695"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d122b2feb1dd76bb5041bdea5e1e1b007d8d415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a541eb401acb89d791da41189d7a79220164b93"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd2e9824e5e7dba406005ff779a107f773175a76"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7d7aa7b730178278109c41fa1b17b06873065d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2f6daf8e99e15d636b1706bb4efd9a856195324"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.