GHSA-M7R2-FJ8R-2R7C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Widen cache_clean_lock over the whole L2TCACTL sequence
v3d_clean_caches() and v3d_flush_l2t() both write the single L2TCACTL register and poll its status bits. The mutex cache_clean_lock exists to serialize them, but v3d_clean_caches() only took the lock around its final FLM_CLEAN write.
These functions run concurrently: v3d_flush_l2t() is issued from the BIN/RENDER/CSD invalidate path while v3d_clean_caches() runs from the CACHE_CLEAN queue, and each queue's scheduler uses its own ordered workqueue, so their run_job callbacks execute in parallel.
Because clean locked only its final write, a concurrent flush can write L2TCACTL during clean's unlocked phase. Both use non read-modify-write writes to the one register, so whichever lands last wins: clean's TMUWCF write can land on the flush's in-flight L2TFLS invalidate, triggering the GFXH-1897 hazard of writing L2TCACTL while a flush is pending.
Hold cache_clean_lock across the entire L2TCACTL access sequence so it is fully mutually exclusive with v3d_flush_l2t(), which already takes the lock around its own write.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99726"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:09Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/v3d: Widen cache_clean_lock over the whole L2TCACTL sequence\n\nv3d_clean_caches() and v3d_flush_l2t() both write the single L2TCACTL\nregister and poll its status bits. The mutex cache_clean_lock exists to\nserialize them, but v3d_clean_caches() only took the lock around its final\nFLM_CLEAN write.\n\nThese functions run concurrently: v3d_flush_l2t() is issued from the\nBIN/RENDER/CSD invalidate path while v3d_clean_caches() runs from the\nCACHE_CLEAN queue, and each queue\u0027s scheduler uses its own ordered\nworkqueue, so their run_job callbacks execute in parallel.\n\nBecause clean locked only its final write, a concurrent flush can write\nL2TCACTL during clean\u0027s unlocked phase. Both use non read-modify-write\nwrites to the one register, so whichever lands last wins: clean\u0027s TMUWCF\nwrite can land on the flush\u0027s in-flight L2TFLS invalidate, triggering the\nGFXH-1897 hazard of writing L2TCACTL while a flush is pending.\n\nHold cache_clean_lock across the entire L2TCACTL access sequence so it\nis fully mutually exclusive with v3d_flush_l2t(), which already takes the\nlock around its own write.",
"id": "GHSA-m7r2-fj8r-2r7c",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b48fe8b323103e278fbc5145231b763577e2487"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/994ba6e5c87d6a3d471ea987fe8622168f092334"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea7ed4ab14f9ae79bd798bb156025bc751c71a9b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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