GHSA-M7JC-G4RC-JMVH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-12 14:41 – Updated: 2026-08-12 14:41
VLAI
Summary
Winter: SQL Injection in Backend Filter Widget numberrange Scope via numbersFromAjax
Details

Impact

The Backend Filter widget (Backend\Widgets\Filter) is vulnerable to SQL injection through the numberrange scope type when the scope is configured with a conditions key. An authenticated backend user with access to a list view containing a vulnerable filter scope can inject arbitrary SQL via the filter's AJAX handler, potentially gaining read access to the full database contents.

To exploit this, an attacker must have a valid backend account with access to a list view where a third-party plugin has registered a numberrange filter scope using the conditions configuration key. No built-in Winter CMS backend views use this scope type and configuration combination, so a vanilla installation without plugins is not exploitable.

Patches

This issue has been fixed in Winter CMS v1.2.13.

Workarounds

If users cannot upgrade, they may apply commit https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/50713de95adf5298536d93f4d999652525d36d43 to your Winter CMS installation manually to resolve this issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.2.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "winter/wn-backend-module"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32593"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-12T14:41:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nThe Backend Filter widget (`Backend\\Widgets\\Filter`) is vulnerable to SQL injection through the `numberrange` scope type when the scope is configured with a `conditions` key. An authenticated backend user with access to a list view containing a vulnerable filter scope can inject arbitrary SQL via the filter\u0027s AJAX handler, potentially gaining read access to the full database contents.\n\nTo exploit this, an attacker must have a valid backend account with access to a list view where a third-party plugin has registered a `numberrange` filter scope using the `conditions` configuration key. No built-in Winter CMS backend views use this scope type and configuration combination, so a vanilla installation without plugins is not exploitable.\n\n## Patches\n\nThis issue has been fixed in Winter CMS v1.2.13.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf users cannot upgrade, they may apply commit https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/50713de95adf5298536d93f4d999652525d36d43 to your Winter CMS\ninstallation manually to resolve this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-m7jc-g4rc-jmvh",
  "modified": "2026-08-12T14:41:13Z",
  "published": "2026-08-12T14:41:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter/security/advisories/GHSA-m7jc-g4rc-jmvh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/50713de95adf5298536d93f4d999652525d36d43"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Winter: SQL Injection in Backend Filter Widget numberrange Scope via numbersFromAjax"
}



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