GHSA-M64R-VRQC-R265

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/hugetlb: fix use-after-free of a new anon folio

For a fault in a private mapping with nothing in the page cache, hugetlb_no_page() allocates a folio, locks it and maps it. The folio has one reference, which belongs to the page table entry from then on. After dropping the page table lock the function still sets the migratable flag of the folio and unlocks it.

Whoever zaps the entry in between frees the folio. The fault holds the fault mutex and the lock of the vma. MADV_DONTNEED and the first unmap of a hole punch, hugetlb_vmdelete_list(), do not take the fault mutex, and a private vma only has a lock if it owns a reservation map: not with MAP_NORESERVE, and not in the child after fork().

Then the flag is set in, and folio_unlock() is called on, a folio that is free or has a new owner. A surplus page goes back to the page allocator while it is locked:

BUG: Bad page state in process init pfn:108e00 flags: 0x200000000000059(locked|uptodate|dirty|head|node=0|zone=2) page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set

A page of the pool can be given to the next user, of any file, who locks it and loses the lock to the late folio_unlock():

kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1532! hugetlb_no_page+0x111b/0x23e0 hugetlb_fault+0x3a9/0x14a0

An unprivileged process is enough: threads that write to a MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_NORESERVE hugetlb mapping, threads that call MADV_DONTNEED on it, and one that takes the freed pages for another file.

Until commit 3a47c54f09c4 ("hugetlbfs: revert use i_mmap_rwsem for more pmd sharing synchronization") the fault held i_mmap_rwsem for reading, which everybody who zaps takes for writing. The lock that commit bf4916922c60 ("hugetlbfs: extend hugetlb_vma_lock to private VMAs") gave to private vmas closed the window again, but only for those with a reservation map.

Be done with the folio before the page table lock is dropped, as hugetlb_wp() is with its copy. The function already unlocks page cache folios under that lock.

Original fix generated by an LLM and sent in private by Josef.

[david@kernel.org: simplify+move comment]

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99506"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:05Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/hugetlb: fix use-after-free of a new anon folio\n\nFor a fault in a private mapping with nothing in the page cache,\nhugetlb_no_page() allocates a folio, locks it and maps it.  The folio has\none reference, which belongs to the page table entry from then on.  After\ndropping the page table lock the function still sets the migratable flag\nof the folio and unlocks it.\n\nWhoever zaps the entry in between frees the folio.  The fault holds the\nfault mutex and the lock of the vma.  MADV_DONTNEED and the first unmap of\na hole punch, hugetlb_vmdelete_list(), do not take the fault mutex, and a\nprivate vma only has a lock if it owns a reservation map: not with\nMAP_NORESERVE, and not in the child after fork().\n\nThen the flag is set in, and folio_unlock() is called on, a folio that is\nfree or has a new owner.  A surplus page goes back to the page allocator\nwhile it is locked:\n\n  BUG: Bad page state in process init  pfn:108e00\n  flags: 0x200000000000059(locked|uptodate|dirty|head|node=0|zone=2)\n  page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set\n\nA page of the pool can be given to the next user, of any file, who locks\nit and loses the lock to the late folio_unlock():\n\n  kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1532!\n   hugetlb_no_page+0x111b/0x23e0\n   hugetlb_fault+0x3a9/0x14a0\n\nAn unprivileged process is enough: threads that write to a MAP_PRIVATE |\nMAP_NORESERVE hugetlb mapping, threads that call MADV_DONTNEED on it, and\none that takes the freed pages for another file.\n\nUntil commit 3a47c54f09c4 (\"hugetlbfs: revert use i_mmap_rwsem for more\npmd sharing synchronization\") the fault held i_mmap_rwsem for reading,\nwhich everybody who zaps takes for writing.  The lock that commit\nbf4916922c60 (\"hugetlbfs: extend hugetlb_vma_lock to private VMAs\") gave\nto private vmas closed the window again, but only for those with a\nreservation map.\n\nBe done with the folio before the page table lock is dropped, as\nhugetlb_wp() is with its copy.  The function already unlocks page cache\nfolios under that lock.\n\nOriginal fix generated by an LLM and sent in private by Josef.\n\n[david@kernel.org: simplify+move comment]",
  "id": "GHSA-m64r-vrqc-r265",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:26Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99506"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1108d9a51c91bb459fa62506fd0176dc9e0927c5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51b21515bdac0a60efac142dbfa44481e4206f28"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/727dfb28c6a2334f08cdaef82540137c9b094ab7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/824cc56bf43c714319992bad3558803cac6e77c0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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