GHSA-M5WC-GF88-8H7M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-14 15:32 – Updated: 2026-10-14 15:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: ipv4: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU

This commit bounds cork->base.fragsize to IP_MAX_MTU to avoid a possible overflow of UDP length that triggers a WARN in udp_set_len_short when setsockopt IP_MTU_DISCOVER is set to IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and a large packet is sent over a netdev with an unusually large MTU.

Steps to reproduce:

  1. Set device MTU bigger than IP_MAX_MTU + 20. cork->base.fragsize will be set to that MTU in ip_setup_cork.
  2. Set IP_MTU_DISCOVER to IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE. It lets maxnonfragsize be set to device MTU (cork->fragsize) in __ip_append_data, rather than to IP_MAX_MTU.
  3. Send 65528 bytes of payload (+8 bytes of UDP header, +20 bytes of IPv4 header). Device MTU allows it (it's only one byte bigger than IP_MAX_MTU + IPv4 header, and the device MTU is bigger than that).
  4. The UDP length in the built packet is 65536, which overflows the 16-bit length field and triggers the WARN in udp_set_len_short.

Note: IP_PMTUDISC_DO with IPv4 is safe, because ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward always clamps at IP_MAX_MTU, unlike ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward.

The Fixes tag points at the first commit where I could reproduce the overflow with IPv4 and IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-98393"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-14T14:17:50Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ipv4: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU\n\nThis commit bounds cork-\u003ebase.fragsize to IP_MAX_MTU to avoid a\npossible overflow of UDP length that triggers a WARN in\nudp_set_len_short when setsockopt IP_MTU_DISCOVER is set to\nIP_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and a large packet is sent over a netdev with an\nunusually large MTU.\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n\n1. Set device MTU bigger than IP_MAX_MTU + 20. cork-\u003ebase.fragsize will\n   be set to that MTU in ip_setup_cork.\n2. Set IP_MTU_DISCOVER to IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE. It lets maxnonfragsize be\n   set to device MTU (cork-\u003efragsize) in __ip_append_data, rather than\n   to IP_MAX_MTU.\n3. Send 65528 bytes of payload (+8 bytes of UDP header, +20 bytes of\n   IPv4 header). Device MTU allows it (it\u0027s only one byte bigger than\n   IP_MAX_MTU + IPv4 header, and the device MTU is bigger than that).\n4. The UDP length in the built packet is 65536, which overflows the\n   16-bit length field and triggers the WARN in udp_set_len_short.\n\nNote: IP_PMTUDISC_DO with IPv4 is safe, because ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward\nalways clamps at IP_MAX_MTU, unlike ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward.\n\nThe Fixes tag points at the first commit where I could reproduce the\noverflow with IPv4 and IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE.",
  "id": "GHSA-m5wc-gf88-8h7m",
  "modified": "2026-10-14T15:32:19Z",
  "published": "2026-10-14T15:32:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98393"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81f540827d243b8dad76c1f44e70ea31719f393c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/83fedc4741210f75be8ca5b487985a242bf6f18d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b83641e0ab8b20eefcc4cdc5a059f897375291a2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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