GHSA-M5RQ-H5XV-G5G9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: imx: fix locked bus on SMBus block-read of 0 (IRQ)
SMBus 3.1 6.5.7 allows a Block Read byte count of 0, but the interrupt-driven block-read state machine rejects it as -EPROTO. Worse, it returns without a NACK+STOP: the next receive cycle has already started, so the target keeps holding SDA and the bus stays stuck until a power cycle of this i2c controller.
Accept count=0: NACK the in-flight dummy byte (TXAK) and set msg->len to 2 so i2c_imx_isr_read_continue() emits STOP via its normal last-byte path. The dummy byte is discarded; block-read callers only consume buf[0..count-1].
Reading I2DR has likewise already armed the next byte on the count > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX error path, so NACK it (TXAK) before aborting with -EPROTO; otherwise the failing transfer's STOP cannot complete and the bus stays held.
The atomic path regressed earlier (v3.16) and is fixed separately; this patch covers only the v6.13 state-machine rework.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72141"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:21:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ni2c: imx: fix locked bus on SMBus block-read of 0 (IRQ)\n\nSMBus 3.1 6.5.7 allows a Block Read byte count of 0, but the\ninterrupt-driven block-read state machine rejects it as -EPROTO. Worse,\nit returns without a NACK+STOP: the next receive cycle has already\nstarted, so the target keeps holding SDA and the bus stays stuck until a\npower cycle of this i2c controller.\n\nAccept count=0: NACK the in-flight dummy byte (TXAK) and set msg-\u003elen to\n2 so i2c_imx_isr_read_continue() emits STOP via its normal last-byte\npath. The dummy byte is discarded; block-read callers only consume\nbuf[0..count-1].\n\nReading I2DR has likewise already armed the next byte on the\ncount \u003e I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX error path, so NACK it (TXAK) before aborting\nwith -EPROTO; otherwise the failing transfer\u0027s STOP cannot complete and\nthe bus stays held.\n\nThe atomic path regressed earlier (v3.16) and is fixed separately; this\npatch covers only the v6.13 state-machine rework.",
"id": "GHSA-m5rq-h5xv-g5g9",
"modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:12Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72141"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07fd9385f0d87dff4b34f355f68adf701080cb24"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56ddfc18ea8f7d77747658892873eb632b2ed530"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d3240f42a667e29262aff76fdebfcdac4980626"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
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